Re: [PATCH] sysctl: control functionality of /proc/pid/mem

[Kees Cook]

On Sat, Jan 21, 2012 at 1:03 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> * Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> @@ -702,6 +704,9 @@ static int mem_open(struct inode* inode, struct file* file)
>>       struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
>>       struct mm_struct *mm;
>>
>> +     if (sysctl_proc_pid_mem < 1)
>> +             return -EACCES;
>
> This looks like an unprivileged user-space triggerable memory
> leak DoS. The task reference is already acquired at that point.

Ah, good catch; thanks. I'll respin.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
ChromeOS Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/