Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execvefrom granting privs

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 12:49 PM, Andrew Morton
<akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500
> Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>
>> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc)
>> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of
>> subverting privileged binaries.
>>
>> This patch completely breaks apparmor.  Someone who understands (and
>> uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint.
>
> So [patch 2/15] fixes all this up?
>
> I guess we should join the two patches into one, to avoid a silly
> breakage window.  That means that John loses a brownie point, but we
> can mention him in the changelog, include his signed-off-by:

Or just fix the commit message.  It no longer completely breaks
AppArmor.  It just causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use.

--Andy
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