Re: [PATCH 1/1] x86/oprofile: Fix the calltrace upon profiling somespecified events with oprofile
From: wyang1
Date: Wed Sep 05 2012 - 21:32:07 EST
On 09/04/2012 06:24 PM, Robert Richter wrote:
Wei,
see my comments below.
On 27.08.12 09:32:13, Wei.Yang@xxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
From: Wei Yang<Wei.Yang@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Upon enabling the call-graph functionality of oprofile, A few minutes
later the following calltrace will always occur.
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 656d6153
IP: [<c10050f5>] print_context_stack+0x55/0x110
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
Pid: 0, comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3-WR5.0+snapshot-20120820_standard
EIP: 0060:[<c10050f5>] EFLAGS: 00010093 CPU: 0
EIP is at print_context_stack+0x55/0x110
EAX: 656d7ffc EBX: 656d6153 ECX: c1837ee0 EDX: 656d6153
ESI: 00000000 EDI: ffffe000 EBP: f600deac ESP: f600de88
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 656d6153 CR3: 01934000 CR4: 000007d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process swapper/0 (pid: 0, ti=f600c000 task=c18411a0 task.ti=c1836000)
Stack:
1a7f76ea 656d7ffc 656d6000 c1837ee0 ffffe000 c1837ee0 656d6153 c188e27c
656d6000 f600dedc c10040f8 c188e27c f600def0 00000000 f600dec8 c1837ee0
00000000 f600ded4 c1837ee0 f600dfc4 0000001f f600df08 c1564d22 00000000
Call Trace:
[<c10040f8>] dump_trace+0x68/0xf0
[<c1564d22>] x86_backtrace+0xb2/0xc0
[<c1562dd2>] oprofile_add_sample+0xa2/0xc0
[<c1003fbf>] ? do_softirq+0x6f/0xa0
[<c1566519>] ppro_check_ctrs+0x79/0x100
[<c15664a0>] ? ppro_shutdown+0x60/0x60
[<c156552f>] profile_exceptions_notify+0x8f/0xb0
[<c1672248>] nmi_handle.isra.0+0x48/0x70
[<c1672343>] do_nmi+0xd3/0x3c0
[<c1033d39>] ? __local_bh_enable+0x29/0x70
[<c1034620>] ? ftrace_define_fields_irq_handler_entry+0x80/0x80
[<c1671a0d>] nmi_stack_correct+0x28/0x2d
[<c1034620>] ? ftrace_define_fields_irq_handler_entry+0x80/0x80
[<c1003fbf>] ? do_softirq+0x6f/0xa0
<IRQ>
[<c1034ad5>] irq_exit+0x65/0x70
[<c16776f9>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x59/0x89
[<c16717da>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x2a/0x30
[<c135164d>] ? acpi_idle_enter_bm+0x245/0x273
[<c14f3a25>] cpuidle_enter+0x15/0x20
[<c14f4070>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xa0/0x320
[<c1009705>] cpu_idle+0x55/0xb0
[<c16519a8>] rest_init+0x6c/0x74
[<c18a291b>] start_kernel+0x2ec/0x2f3
[<c18a2467>] ? repair_env_string+0x51/0x51
[<c18a22a2>] i386_start_kernel+0x78/0x7d
Code: e0 ff ff 89 7d ec 74 5a 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 8d bc 27 00 00
00 00 39 f3 72 0c 8b 45 f0 8d 64 24 18 5b 5e 5f 5d c3 3b 5d ec 72
ef<8b> 3b 89 f8 89 7d dc e8 ef 40 04 00 85 c0 74 20 8b 40
EIP: [<c10050f5>] print_context_stack+0x55/0x110 SS:ESP 0068:f600de88
CR2: 00000000656d6153
---[ end trace 751c9b47c6ff5e29 ]---
Let's assume a scenario that do_softirq() switches the stack to a soft irq
stack, and the soft irq stack is totally empty. At this moment, a nmi interrupt
occurs, subsequently, CPU does not automatically save SS and SP registers
and switch any stack, but instead only stores EFLAGS, CS and IP to the soft irq
stack. since the CPU is in kernel mode when the NMI exception occurs.
the layout of the current soft irq stack is this:
+--------------+<-----the top of soft irq
| EFLAGS |
+--------------+
| CS |
+--------------+
| IP |
+--------------+
| SAVE_ALL |
+--------------+
but the return value of the function kernel_stack_pointer() is'®s->sp'
(for x86_32 CPU), which is invoked by the x86_backtrace function. Since
the type of regs pointer is a pt_regs structure, the return value is not
in the range of the soft irq stack, as the SP register is not save in the
soft irq stack. Therefore, we need to check if the return value of the function
resides in valid range. Additionally, the changes has no impact on the normal
NMI exception.
Signed-off-by: Yang Wei<wei.yang@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c b/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c
index d6aa6e8..a5fca0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c
@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
#include<asm/ptrace.h>
#include<asm/stacktrace.h>
+static inline int valid_stack_ptr(struct thread_info *tinfo, void *p)
+{
+ void *t = tinfo;
+ return p> t + sizeof(struct thread_info)&& p< t + THREAD_SIZE;
+}
static int backtrace_stack(void *data, char *name)
{
/* Yes, we want all stacks */
@@ -110,9 +115,14 @@ void
x86_backtrace(struct pt_regs * const regs, unsigned int depth)
{
struct stack_frame *head = (struct stack_frame *)frame_pointer(regs);
+ struct thread_info *context;
if (!user_mode_vm(regs)) {
unsigned long stack = kernel_stack_pointer(regs);
+ context = (struct thread_info *)
+ (stack& (~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)));
You derive the context from a potential wrong stack here.
+ if (!valid_stack_ptr(context, (void *)stack))
Thus, you basically test this:
if (t& (THREAD_SIZE - 1)< sizeof(struct thread_info))
...
+ return;
if (depth)
dump_trace(NULL, regs, (unsigned long *)stack, 0,
&backtrace_ops,&depth);
--
1.7.0.2
Though this patch prevents access to an invalid stack (NULL pointer
access or page fault), I don't think this is the proper fix since it
does not fix the root cause that is an invalid stack pointer deliverd
by kernel_stack_pointer(). Also, a fix only in oprofile code does not
solve other uses of dump_trace()/kernel_stack_pointer().
Robert,
I agreed what you said, my patch more likes a workaround.
So the proper fix I see is to fix kernel_stack_pointer() to return a
valid stack in case of an empty stack while in softirq. Something like
the patch below. Maybe it must be optimized a bit. I tested the patch
over night with no issues found. Please test it too.
I also tested the following patch over night. it is fine.:-)
Thanks
Wei
Thanks,
-Robert
> From 8e7c16913b1fcfc63f7b24337551aacc7153c334 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Robert Richter<robert.richter@xxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2012 20:54:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x86, 32-bit: Fix invalid stack address while in softirq
In 32 bit the stack address provided by kernel_stack_pointer() may
point to an invalid range causing NULL pointer access or page faults
while in NMI (see trace below). This happens if called in softirq
context and if the stack is empty. The address at®s->sp is then
out of range.
Fixing this by checking if regs and®s->sp are in the same stack
context. Otherwise return the previous stack pointer stored in struct
thread_info.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000a
IP: [<c1004237>] print_context_stack+0x6e/0x8d
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
Pid: 4434, comm: perl Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3-oprofile-i386-standard-g4411a05 #4 Hewlett-Packard HP xw9400 Workstation/0A1Ch
EIP: 0060:[<c1004237>] EFLAGS: 00010093 CPU: 0
EIP is at print_context_stack+0x6e/0x8d
EAX: ffffe000 EBX: 0000000a ECX: f4435f94 EDX: 0000000a
ESI: f4435f94 EDI: f4435f94 EBP: f5409ec0 ESP: f5409ea0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 0000000a CR3: 34ac9000 CR4: 000007d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process perl (pid: 4434, ti=f5408000 task=f5637850 task.ti=f4434000)
Stack:
000003e8 ffffe000 00001ffc f4e39b00 00000000 0000000a f4435f94 c155198c
f5409ef0 c1003723 c155198c f5409f04 00000000 f5409edc 00000000 00000000
f5409ee8 f4435f94 f5409fc4 00000001 f5409f1c c12dce1c 00000000 c155198c
Call Trace:
[<c1003723>] dump_trace+0x7b/0xa1
[<c12dce1c>] x86_backtrace+0x40/0x88
[<c12db712>] ? oprofile_add_sample+0x56/0x84
[<c12db731>] oprofile_add_sample+0x75/0x84
[<c12ddb5b>] op_amd_check_ctrs+0x46/0x260
[<c12dd40d>] profile_exceptions_notify+0x23/0x4c
[<c1395034>] nmi_handle+0x31/0x4a
[<c1029dc5>] ? ftrace_define_fields_irq_handler_entry+0x45/0x45
[<c13950ed>] do_nmi+0xa0/0x2ff
[<c1029dc5>] ? ftrace_define_fields_irq_handler_entry+0x45/0x45
[<c13949e5>] nmi_stack_correct+0x28/0x2d
[<c1029dc5>] ? ftrace_define_fields_irq_handler_entry+0x45/0x45
[<c1003603>] ? do_softirq+0x4b/0x7f
<IRQ>
[<c102a06f>] irq_exit+0x35/0x5b
[<c1018f56>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x7a
[<c1394746>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x2a/0x30
Code: 89 fe eb 08 31 c9 8b 45 0c ff 55 ec 83 c3 04 83 7d 10 00 74 0c 3b 5d 10 73 26 3b 5d e4 73 0c eb 1f 3b 5d f0 76 1a 3b 5d e8 73 15<8b> 13 89 d0 89 55 e0 e8 ad 42 03 00 85 c0 8b 55 e0 75 a6 eb cc
EIP: [<c1004237>] print_context_stack+0x6e/0x8d SS:ESP 0068:f5409ea0
CR2: 000000000000000a
---[ end trace 62afee3481b00012 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Reported-by: Yang Wei<wei.yang@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Robert Richter<robert.richter@xxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 15 ++++-----------
arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
index dcfde52..19f16eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h
@@ -205,21 +205,14 @@ static inline bool user_64bit_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
}
#endif
-/*
- * X86_32 CPUs don't save ss and esp if the CPU is already in kernel mode
- * when it traps. The previous stack will be directly underneath the saved
- * registers, and 'sp/ss' won't even have been saved. Thus the '®s->sp'.
- *
- * This is valid only for kernel mode traps.
- */
-static inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
- return (unsigned long)(®s->sp);
+extern unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs);
#else
+static inline unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
return regs->sp;
-#endif
}
+#endif
#define GET_IP(regs) ((regs)->ip)
#define GET_FP(regs) ((regs)->bp)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index c4c6a5c..5a9a8c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -165,6 +165,27 @@ static inline bool invalid_selector(u16 value)
#define FLAG_MASK FLAG_MASK_32
+/*
+ * X86_32 CPUs don't save ss and esp if the CPU is already in kernel mode
+ * when it traps. The previous stack will be directly underneath the saved
+ * registers, and 'sp/ss' won't even have been saved. Thus the '®s->sp'.
+ *
+ * This is valid only for kernel mode traps.
+ */
+unsigned long kernel_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ unsigned long context = (unsigned long)regs& ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1);
+ unsigned long sp = (unsigned long)®s->sp;
+ struct thread_info *tinfo;
+
+ if (context == (sp& ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1)))
+ return sp;
+
+ tinfo = (struct thread_info *)context;
+
+ return tinfo->previous_esp;
+}
+
static unsigned long *pt_regs_access(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long regno)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct pt_regs, bx) != 0);
diff --git a/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c b/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c
index d6aa6e8..5b5741e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/oprofile/backtrace.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ x86_backtrace(struct pt_regs * const regs, unsigned int depth)
if (!user_mode_vm(regs)) {
unsigned long stack = kernel_stack_pointer(regs);
- if (depth)
+ if (depth& stack)
dump_trace(NULL, regs, (unsigned long *)stack, 0,
&backtrace_ops,&depth);
return;
--
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