Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries

[Theodore Ts'o]

On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 06:17:33PM +0000, David Howells wrote:
> 
> There's a problem with your idea.
> 
>  (1) Microsoft's revocation certificates would be based on the hash of the PE
>      binary, not the key.
> 
>  (2) Re-signing would make the keys then dependent on our master key rather
>      than directly on Microsoft's.  Microsoft's revocation certificates[*]
>      would then be useless.
> 
>  (3) The only way Microsoft could then revoke the extra keys would be to
>      revoke our *master* key.

Well, this hypothetical service could also simply scan the Microsoft
revocation certificates (aka CRL's), and if the service detects a PE
hash that it relied upon to resign the module, it could then issue its
own CRL revoking the signature on the module.

If it is run this way, programmatically, I'll note that anyone can run
this service.  It doesn't have to be Red Hat.  It could be Linux
Foundation, if the LF wanted to support this whole code signing
insanity.  (Which I really think is completely overblown, and I'm
going to be amused when this blows to hell all of Red Hat's
investments in Systemtap, but whatever.)  Given that I think this
whole thing is insane, I completely agree with Linus's attempt to keep
this insanity as far away from the upstream kernel as we can.  :-/

     	      	     	       	   - Ted
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/