Re: [GIT PULL] Load keys from signed PE binaries

From: Matthew Garrett
Date: Thu Feb 28 2013 - 18:05:35 EST


On Fri, Mar 01, 2013 at 12:02:43AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:

> But the real harm is being done by the i_own_your_ring0.ko module, which
> can be modprobed on all the systems where the signed "hello world" binary
> has been keyctl-ed before it was blacklisted.

Sure, if you've been infected before the revocation, you'll still be
infected. There's not really any good way around that.

> In other words -- you blacklist the population of the key on systems by
> blakclisting the key-carrying binary, but the key remains trusted on
> whatever system the binary has been processed by keyctl before. Right?

You have to re-load it on every boot, it's not a permanent thing.

--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
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