[PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only

[Kees Cook]

This makes the IDT unconditionally read-only. This primarily removes
the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory write attacks. It has
an added benefit of also not leaking (via the "sidt" instruction) the
kernel base offset, if it has been relocated.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Eric Northup <digitaleric@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h |    4 +---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c   |   15 ---------------
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c       |    8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/xen/mmu.c            |    4 +---
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
index a09c285..51b9e32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fixmap.h
@@ -104,9 +104,7 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
 	FIX_LI_PCIA,	/* Lithium PCI Bridge A */
 	FIX_LI_PCIB,	/* Lithium PCI Bridge B */
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
-	FIX_F00F_IDT,	/* Virtual mapping for IDT */
-#endif
+	FIX_RO_IDT,	/* Virtual mapping for read-only IDT */
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_CYCLONE_TIMER
 	FIX_CYCLONE_TIMER, /*cyclone timer register*/
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index 1905ce9..76148a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -164,20 +164,6 @@ int __cpuinit ppro_with_ram_bug(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
-static void __cpuinit trap_init_f00f_bug(void)
-{
-	__set_fixmap(FIX_F00F_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
-
-	/*
-	 * Update the IDT descriptor and reload the IDT so that
-	 * it uses the read-only mapped virtual address.
-	 */
-	idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_F00F_IDT);
-	load_idt(&idt_descr);
-}
-#endif
-
 static void __cpuinit intel_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	/* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
@@ -215,7 +201,6 @@ static void __cpuinit intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 		c->f00f_bug = 1;
 		if (!f00f_workaround_enabled) {
-			trap_init_f00f_bug();
 			printk(KERN_NOTICE "Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug - workaround enabled.\n");
 			f00f_workaround_enabled = 1;
 		}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 68bda7a..a2a9b78 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -753,6 +753,14 @@ void __init trap_init(void)
 #endif
 
 	/*
+	 * Set the IDT descriptor to a fixed read-only location, so that the
+	 * "sidt" instruction will not leak the location of the kernel, and
+	 * to defend the IDT against arbitrary memory write vulnerabilities.
+	 * It will be reloaded in cpu_init() */
+	__set_fixmap(FIX_RO_IDT, __pa_symbol(idt_table), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+	idt_descr.address = fix_to_virt(FIX_RO_IDT);
+
+	/*
 	 * Should be a barrier for any external CPU state:
 	 */
 	cpu_init();
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
index 6afbb2c..8bc4dec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c
@@ -2039,9 +2039,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot)
 
 	switch (idx) {
 	case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN:
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
-	case FIX_F00F_IDT:
-#endif
+	case FIX_RO_IDT:
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	case FIX_WP_TEST:
 	case FIX_VDSO:
-- 
1.7.9.5


-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
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