Re: [PATCH RFC 00/48] Add namespace support for audit

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx):
> On Tue, 2013-06-11 at 13:59 +0800, Gao feng wrote:
> > On 06/11/2013 05:24 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > Quoting Gao feng (gaofeng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> > >> On 06/07/2013 06:47 AM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> > >>> Quoting Serge Hallyn (serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx):
> > >>>> Quoting Gao feng (gaofeng@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> > >>>>> On 05/07/2013 10:20 AM, Gao feng wrote:
> 
> > In my option, the audit rules(inode, tree_list, filter) , some of audit
> > controller related resources(enabled,pid,portid...) and skb queue, audit
> > netlink sockets,kauditd thread should be per-userns. The audit user message
> > which generated by the user in container should be per-userns too.
> > 
> > Since netns is not implemented as a hierarchy, and the network related
> > resources are not global. so network related audit message should be per-userns too.
> > 
> > The security related audit message should be send to init user namespace
> > as we discussed before. Maybe tty related audit message should be send
> > to init user namespace too, I have no idea now.
> > 
> > The next step, I will post a new patchset which only make the audit user
> > message and the basic audit resource per userns. I think this patchset
> > will easy to be reviewed and accepted, And will not influence the host.
> > This patchset contains the below patches:
> 
> I think this would be easier for us do from a certification and
> doumentation PoV if we had an audit namespace, not tied to the user
> namespace.  creating a new audit namespace should require
> CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL in the user namespace which created the current audit
> namespace.
> 
> Does that make sense?  I don't mind messages staying completely inside
> the current namespace, but that means we can't give unpriv users (even
> if they have priv in their user namespace) a new audit namespace...

I think that makes sense.

One of the goals for user namespace is to ensure that unprivileged users
can play with their environment without the risk of setuid-root apps on
the host being tricked by the new environment.  This makes tying the
audit ns to the user ns trickier.

-serge
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