[REVIEW][PATCH 2/5] userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace.

[Eric W. Biederman]

As the capabilites and capability bounding set are per user namespace
properties it is safe to allow changing them with just CAP_SETPCAP
permission in the user namespace.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@xxxxxx>
---
 security/commoncap.c |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c44b6fe..9fccf71 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
  */
 static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap)
 {
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+	if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (!cap_valid(cap))
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
1.7.5.4

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