Re: [PATCH] LSM: ModPin LSM for module loading restrictions

From: Kees Cook
Date: Thu Oct 03 2013 - 16:55:42 EST

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On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 06:45:35PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> [+rusty]
>
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 6:28 PM, James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Tue, 24 Sep 2013, James Morris wrote:
> >
> >> On Fri, 20 Sep 2013, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>
> >> > This LSM enforces that modules must all come from the same filesystem,
> >> > with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only
> >> > device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a
> >> > verified or unchanging filesystem to enforce module loading restrictions
> >> > without needing to sign the modules individually.
> >> >
> >> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >>
> >> Are you using this for ChromeOS?
>
> Yes. Chrome OS uses a read-only root filesystem that is backed by
> dm-verity. This lets us pin all module loading to that filesystem
> without needing per-module signatures.
>
> > Also, you should CC Rusty on this.
>
> Done! :)

Ping... any feedback on this? I'd like to get this landed so I can send
further patches that touch this and IMA.

Thanks,

-Kees

>
> -Kees
>
> >
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> > ---
> >> > security/Kconfig | 6 ++
> >> > security/Makefile | 2 +
> >> > security/modpin/Kconfig | 9 +++
> >> > security/modpin/Makefile | 1 +
> >> > security/modpin/modpin.c | 197 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >> > 5 files changed, 215 insertions(+)
> >> > create mode 100644 security/modpin/Kconfig
> >> > create mode 100644 security/modpin/Makefile
> >> > create mode 100644 security/modpin/modpin.c
> >> >
> >> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> >> > index e9c6ac7..80172fd 100644
> >> > --- a/security/Kconfig
> >> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> >> > @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
> >> > source security/smack/Kconfig
> >> > source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
> >> > source security/apparmor/Kconfig
> >> > +source security/modpin/Kconfig
> >> > source security/yama/Kconfig
> >> >
> >> > source security/integrity/Kconfig
> >> > @@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ choice
> >> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
> >> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
> >> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
> >> > + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_MODPIN if SECURITY_MODPIN
> >> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
> >> > default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
> >> >
> >> > @@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ choice
> >> > config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> >> > bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
> >> >
> >> > + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_MODPIN
> >> > + bool "ModPin" if SECURITY_MODPIN=y
> >> > +
> >> > config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
> >> > bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
> >> >
> >> > @@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
> >> > default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
> >> > default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
> >> > default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> >> > + default "modpin" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_MODPIN
> >> > default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
> >> > default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
> >> >
> >> > diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
> >> > index c26c81e..73d0a05 100644
> >> > --- a/security/Makefile
> >> > +++ b/security/Makefile
> >> > @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
> >> > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
> >> > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
> >> > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor
> >> > +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODPIN) += modpin
> >> > subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama
> >> >
> >> > # always enable default capabilities
> >> > @@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
> >> > obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += lsm_audit.o
> >> > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
> >> > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor/built-in.o
> >> > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODPIN) += modpin/built-in.o
> >> > obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) += yama/built-in.o
> >> > obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
> >> >
> >> > diff --git a/security/modpin/Kconfig b/security/modpin/Kconfig
> >> > new file mode 100644
> >> > index 0000000..5be9dd5
> >> > --- /dev/null
> >> > +++ b/security/modpin/Kconfig
> >> > @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
> >> > +config SECURITY_MODPIN
> >> > + bool "Module filesystem origin pinning"
> >> > + depends on SECURITY
> >> > + help
> >> > + Module loading will be pinned to the first filesystem used for
> >> > + loading. Any modules that come from other filesystems will be
> >> > + rejected. This is best used on systems without an initrd that
> >> > + have a root filesystem backed by a read-only device such as
> >> > + dm-verity or a CDROM.
> >> > diff --git a/security/modpin/Makefile b/security/modpin/Makefile
> >> > new file mode 100644
> >> > index 0000000..9080b29
> >> > --- /dev/null
> >> > +++ b/security/modpin/Makefile
> >> > @@ -0,0 +1 @@
> >> > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MODPIN) += modpin.o
> >> > diff --git a/security/modpin/modpin.c b/security/modpin/modpin.c
> >> > new file mode 100644
> >> > index 0000000..107b4d8
> >> > --- /dev/null
> >> > +++ b/security/modpin/modpin.c
> >> > @@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
> >> > +/*
> >> > + * Module Pinning Security Module
> >> > + *
> >> > + * Copyright 2011-2013 Google Inc.
> >> > + *
> >> > + * Authors:
> >> > + * Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> > + *
> >> > + * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
> >> > + * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
> >> > + * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
> >> > + *
> >> > + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> >> > + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> >> > + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> >> > + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> >> > + */
> >> > +
> >> > +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "ModPin LSM: " fmt
> >> > +
> >> > +#include <linux/module.h>
> >> > +#include <linux/security.h>
> >> > +#include <linux/sched.h>
> >> > +#include <linux/fs.h>
> >> > +#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> >> > +#include <linux/mount.h>
> >> > +#include <linux/path.h>
> >> > +#include <linux/root_dev.h>
> >> > +
> >> > +static void report_load_module(struct path *path, char *operation)
> >> > +{
> >> > + char *alloced = NULL;
> >> > + char *pathname; /* Pointer to either static string or "alloced". */
> >> > +
> >> > + if (!path)
> >> > + pathname = "<unknown>";
> >> > + else {
> >> > + /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */
> >> > + alloced = pathname = kmalloc(PATH_MAX+11, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> > + if (!pathname)
> >> > + pathname = "<no_memory>";
> >> > + else {
> >> > + pathname = d_path(path, pathname, PATH_MAX+11);
> >> > + if (IS_ERR(pathname))
> >> > + pathname = "<too_long>";
> >> > + }
> >> > + }
> >> > +
> >> > + pr_notice("init_module %s module=%s pid=%d\n",
> >> > + operation, pathname, task_pid_nr(current));
> >> > +
> >> > + kfree(alloced);
> >> > +}
> >> > +
> >> > +static int modpin_enforced = 1;
> >> > +static struct dentry *pinned_root;
> >> > +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock);
> >> > +
> >> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
> >> > +static int zero;
> >> > +static int one = 1;
> >> > +
> >> > +static struct ctl_path modpin_sysctl_path[] = {
> >> > + { .procname = "kernel", },
> >> > + { .procname = "modpin", },
> >> > + { }
> >> > +};
> >> > +
> >> > +static struct ctl_table modpin_sysctl_table[] = {
> >> > + {
> >> > + .procname = "enforced",
> >> > + .data = &modpin_enforced,
> >> > + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
> >> > + .mode = 0644,
> >> > + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> >> > + .extra1 = &zero,
> >> > + .extra2 = &one,
> >> > + },
> >> > + { }
> >> > +};
> >> > +
> >> > +/*
> >> > + * Check if the root device is read-only (e.g. dm-verity is enabled).
> >> > + * This must be called after early kernel init, since only then is the
> >> > + * rootdev available.
> >> > + */
> >> > +static bool rootdev_readonly(void)
> >> > +{
> >> > + bool rc;
> >> > + struct block_device *bdev;
> >> > + const fmode_t mode = FMODE_WRITE;
> >> > +
> >> > + bdev = blkdev_get_by_dev(ROOT_DEV, mode, NULL);
> >> > + if (IS_ERR(bdev)) {
> >> > + /* In this weird case, assume it is read-only. */
> >> > + pr_info("dev(%u,%u): FMODE_WRITE disallowed?!\n",
> >> > + MAJOR(ROOT_DEV), MINOR(ROOT_DEV));
> >> > + return true;
> >> > + }
> >> > +
> >> > + rc = bdev_read_only(bdev);
> >> > + blkdev_put(bdev, mode);
> >> > +
> >> > + pr_info("dev(%u,%u): %s\n", MAJOR(ROOT_DEV), MINOR(ROOT_DEV),
> >> > + rc ? "read-only" : "writable");
> >> > +
> >> > + return rc;
> >> > +}
> >> > +
> >> > +static void check_pinning_enforcement(void)
> >> > +{
> >> > + /*
> >> > + * If module pinning is not being enforced, allow sysctl to change
> >> > + * modes for testing.
> >> > + */
> >> > + if (!rootdev_readonly()) {
> >> > + if (!register_sysctl_paths(modpin_sysctl_path,
> >> > + modpin_sysctl_table))
> >> > + pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
> >> > + else
> >> > + pr_info("module pinning can be disabled.\n");
> >> > + } else
> >> > + pr_info("module pinning engaged.\n");
> >> > +}
> >> > +#else
> >> > +static void check_pinning_enforcement(void) { }
> >> > +#endif
> >> > +
> >> > +
> >> > +static int modpin_load_module(struct file *file)
> >> > +{
> >> > + struct dentry *module_root;
> >> > +
> >> > + if (!file) {
> >> > + if (!modpin_enforced) {
> >> > + report_load_module(NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored");
> >> > + return 0;
> >> > + }
> >> > +
> >> > + report_load_module(NULL, "old-api-denied");
> >> > + return -EPERM;
> >> > + }
> >> > +
> >> > + module_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_root;
> >> > +
> >> > + /* First loaded module defines the root for all others. */
> >> > + spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
> >> > + if (!pinned_root) {
> >> > + pinned_root = dget(module_root);
> >> > + /*
> >> > + * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about.
> >> > + * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning
> >> > + * failures before we have announced that pinning is
> >> > + * enabled. This would be purely cosmetic.
> >> > + */
> >> > + spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
> >> > + check_pinning_enforcement();
> >> > + report_load_module(&file->f_path, "pinned");
> >> > + return 0;
> >> > + }
> >> > + spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock);
> >> > +
> >> > + if (module_root != pinned_root) {
> >> > + if (unlikely(!modpin_enforced)) {
> >> > + report_load_module(&file->f_path, "pinning-ignored");
> >> > + return 0;
> >> > + }
> >> > +
> >> > + report_load_module(&file->f_path, "denied");
> >> > + return -EPERM;
> >> > + }
> >> > +
> >> > + return 0;
> >> > +}
> >> > +
> >> > +static struct security_operations modpin_ops = {
> >> > + .name = "modpin",
> >> > + .kernel_module_from_file = modpin_load_module,
> >> > +};
> >> > +
> >> > +static int __init modpin_init(void)
> >> > +{
> >> > + int error;
> >> > +
> >> > + error = register_security(&modpin_ops);
> >> > +
> >> > + if (error)
> >> > + panic("Could not register ModPin security module");
> >> > +
> >> > + pr_info("ready to pin.\n");
> >> > +
> >> > + return error;
> >> > +}
> >> > +security_initcall(modpin_init);
> >> > +
> >> > +module_param(modpin_enforced, int, S_IRUSR);
> >> > +MODULE_PARM_DESC(modpin_enforced, "Module pinning enforced (default: true)");
> >> > --
> >> > 1.7.9.5
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > --
> >> > Kees Cook
> >> > Chrome OS Security
> >> > --
> >> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> >> > the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> >> > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
> >> >
> >>
> >> --
> >> James Morris
> >> <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
> >> --
> >> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> >> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> >>
> >
> > --
> > James Morris
> > <jmorris@xxxxxxxxx>
>
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

--
Kees Cook @outflux.net
--
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Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

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