Re: [PATCH] LSM: MntRestrict blocks mounts on symlink targets

[Kees Cook]

Pinging on this too. Any feedback?

-Kees

On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 03:59:59PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On systems where certain filesystem contents cannot be entirely trusted,
> it is beneficial to block mounts on symlinks. This makes sure that
> malicious filesystem contents cannot trigger the over-mounting of trusted
> filesystems. (For example, a bind-mounted subdirectory of /var cannot be
> redirected to mount on /etc via a symlink: a daemon cannot elevate privs
> to uid-0.)
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  security/Kconfig                   |    6 ++++
>  security/Makefile                  |    2 ++
>  security/mntrestrict/Kconfig       |   13 ++++++++
>  security/mntrestrict/Makefile      |    1 +
>  security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c |   63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  5 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
>  create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/Makefile
>  create mode 100644 security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
> 
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index e9c6ac7..84d41f4 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
>  source security/smack/Kconfig
>  source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
>  source security/apparmor/Kconfig
> +source security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
>  source security/yama/Kconfig
>  
>  source security/integrity/Kconfig
> @@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ choice
>  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
>  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
>  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
> +	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
>  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
>  	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
>  
> @@ -150,6 +152,9 @@ choice
>  	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
>  		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
>  
> +	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
> +		bool "MntRestrict" if SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT=y
> +
>  	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
>  		bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
>  
> @@ -164,6 +169,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
>  	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
>  	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
>  	default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
> +	default "mntrestrict" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
>  	default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
>  	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
>  
> diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
> index c26c81e..33f38b1 100644
> --- a/security/Makefile
> +++ b/security/Makefile
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)	+= apparmor
> +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT)	+= mntrestrict
>  subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama
>  
>  # always enable default capabilities
> @@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)			+= lsm_audit.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)		+= tomoyo/built-in.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)		+= apparmor/built-in.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT)	+= mntrestrict/built-in.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)		+= yama/built-in.o
>  obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)		+= device_cgroup.o
>  
> diff --git a/security/mntrestrict/Kconfig b/security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..9a7310d
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/mntrestrict/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
> +config SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT
> +	bool "Restrict mounts on symlinks system-wide"
> +	depends on SECURITY
> +	help
> +	  Enforces that rule that symlinks cannot be used as mount
> +	  destinations across the entire system. This is to make sure
> +	  it is never possible to redirect locations using symlinks
> +	  when the process doing the mount may not be able to strictly
> +	  trust the contents of the filesystem where it is happening. For
> +	  example, making sure a bind mounted subdirectory in /var is not
> +	  redirected into /etc: stops a daemon without full privileges
> +	  from elevating to uid-0 by tricking the system init filesystem
> +	  mounting infrastructure.
> diff --git a/security/mntrestrict/Makefile b/security/mntrestrict/Makefile
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..340be1f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/mntrestrict/Makefile
> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_MNTRESTRICT) += mntrestrict.o
> diff --git a/security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c b/security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..257ae69
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/mntrestrict/mntrestrict.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
> +/*
> + * Mount Restriction Security Module
> + *
> + * Copyright 2011-2013 Google Inc.
> + *
> + * Authors:
> + *      Stephan Uphoff  <ups@xxxxxxxxxx>
> + *      Kees Cook       <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> + *
> + * This software is licensed under the terms of the GNU General Public
> + * License version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation, and
> + * may be copied, distributed, and modified under those terms.
> + *
> + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
> + * GNU General Public License for more details.
> + */
> +
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MntRestrict LSM: " fmt
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> +#include <linux/mount.h>
> +#include <linux/path.h>
> +#include <linux/root_dev.h>
> +
> +static int mntrestrict_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
> +				const char *type, unsigned long flags,
> +				void *data)
> +{
> +	int error = current->total_link_count ? -ELOOP : 0;
> +
> +	if (error) {
> +		pr_notice("Mount path with symlinks prohibited - pid=%d\n",
> +			task_pid_nr(current));
> +	}
> +
> +	return error;
> +}
> +
> +static struct security_operations mntrestrict_ops = {
> +	.name	= "mntrestrict",
> +	.sb_mount = mntrestrict_sb_mount,
> +};
> +
> +static int __init mntrestrict_init(void)
> +{
> +	int error;
> +
> +	error = register_security(&mntrestrict_ops);
> +
> +	if (error)
> +		panic("Could not register MntRestrict security module");
> +
> +	pr_info("symlink destinations will be blocked.\n");
> +
> +	return error;
> +}
> +security_initcall(mntrestrict_init);
> -- 
> 1.7.9.5
> 
> 
> -- 
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS Security
> --
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-- 
Kees Cook                                            @outflux.net
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