RE: [char-misc-next 2/8] mei: hbm: validate client index is notexceeding allocated array size

From: Winkler, Tomas
Date: Wed Oct 30 2013 - 03:31:17 EST




> > ---
> > drivers/misc/mei/hbm.c | 6 ++++--
> > 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/misc/mei/hbm.c b/drivers/misc/mei/hbm.c
> > index 9b3a0fb..0f5e8ca 100644
> > --- a/drivers/misc/mei/hbm.c
> > +++ b/drivers/misc/mei/hbm.c
> > @@ -228,8 +228,6 @@ static int mei_hbm_prop_req(struct mei_device *dev)
> > unsigned long client_num;
> >
> >
> > - client_num = dev->me_client_presentation_num;
> > -
> > next_client_index = find_next_bit(dev->me_clients_map,
> MEI_CLIENTS_MAX,
> > dev->me_client_index);
> >
> > @@ -241,6 +239,10 @@ static int mei_hbm_prop_req(struct mei_device *dev)
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> > + client_num = dev->me_client_presentation_num;
> > + if (WARN_ON(dev->me_clients_num <= client_num))
> > + return -EIO;
>
> How can this happen? Why is spitting out a huge warning in the syslog
> going to help anything? If a user can do this, then great, now you can
> DoS your syslog :(
>
> If a user can't do this, then why tell them, it's your driver's bug that
> you should just fix.

This somehow should guard buffer overflow allocated of size dev->me_clients_num
In theory this can happen only if something go wrong in hardware initialization or there is some other security hole that can change client_num.

After this happen you probably won't be able to use the driver anyhow so I do not expect DoS on the syslog, but we can drop the WARN_ON
but I would stick with the check

Thanks
Tomas



--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/