Re: [PATCH 2/8] integrity: fix checkpatch errors
From: Mimi Zohar
Date: Mon Mar 03 2014 - 08:41:47 EST
On Fri, 2014-02-28 at 16:59 +0200, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> Unfixed checkpatch errors make it difficult to see new errors..
> This patch fix them.
A number of these errors are a result of inconsistencies between Lindent
and checkpatch. This patch uses the checkpatch preferences.
> Some lines with over 80 chars remained unchanged to improve
> code readability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@xxxxxxxxxxx>
This patch doesn't apply cleanly to either linux-integrity/next-fixes or
to linux-security/next.
thanks,
Mimi
> ---
> security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 28 +++++++-------
> security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 4 +-
> security/integrity/iint.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 ++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 6 +--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++------------------
> security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 4 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 14 +++----
> security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 4 +-
> 11 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
> index 30bd1ec..37c88dd 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
> @@ -32,19 +32,19 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
> /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
> extern char *evm_config_xattrnames[];
>
> -extern int evm_init_key(void);
> -extern int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> - const char *req_xattr_name,
> - const char *req_xattr_value,
> - size_t req_xattr_value_len);
> -extern int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
> - const char *req_xattr_value,
> - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
> -extern int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
> - const char *req_xattr_value,
> - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
> -extern int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
> - char *hmac_val);
> -extern int evm_init_secfs(void);
> +int evm_init_key(void);
> +int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
> + const char *req_xattr_name,
> + const char *req_xattr_value,
> + size_t req_xattr_value_len);
> +int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
> + const char *req_xattr_value,
> + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
> +int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
> + const char *req_xattr_value,
> + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
> +int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
> + char *hmac_val);
> +int evm_init_secfs(void);
>
> #endif
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index 9bd329f..babd862 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -105,13 +105,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
> umode_t mode;
> } hmac_misc;
>
> - memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof hmac_misc);
> + memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
> hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
> hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
> hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
> hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
> hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
> - crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof hmac_misc);
> + crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
> if (evm_hmac_version > 1)
> crypto_shash_update(desc, inode->i_sb->s_uuid,
> sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid));
> diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
> index c49d3f1..a521edf 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
> @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
> {
> struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo;
>
> - memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
> + memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint));
> iint->version = 0;
> iint->flags = 0UL;
> iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index 393b9d4..c6b4a73 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ err_out:
> * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, MMAP_CHECK, MODULE_CHECK)
> *
> * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
> - * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
> + * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
> * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
> - * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
> - * mask: contains the permission mask
> + * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK
> + * mask: contains the permission mask
> * fsmagic: hex value
> *
> * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
> @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> *
> * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
> * but the measurement could already exist:
> - * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
> + * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
> * different filesystems.
> * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
> * containing the hashing info.
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> index 9999057..d257e36 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
> @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
> * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> *
> * File: ima_crypto.c
> - * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
> + * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
> */
>
> #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> index 468a3ba..da92fcc 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> @@ -133,14 +133,14 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
> * little-endian format
> */
> - ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
> + ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
>
> /* 2nd: template digest */
> ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
>
> /* 3rd: template name size */
> namelen = strlen(e->template_desc->name);
> - ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
> + ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof(namelen));
>
> /* 4th: template name */
> ima_putc(m, e->template_desc->name, namelen);
> @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
> /*
> * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
> */
> -static int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
> +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
> {
> /* No point in being allowed to open it if you aren't going to write */
> if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY))
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 149ee11..50413d0 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
> * ima_rdwr_violation_check
> *
> * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
> - * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
> + * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
> * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
> * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
> - * could result in a file measurement error.
> + * could result in a file measurement error.
> *
> */
> static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 947cdbe..41021b4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
> * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> *
> * ima_policy.c
> - * - initialize default measure policy rules
> + * - initialize default measure policy rules
> *
> */
> #include <linux/module.h>
> @@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
> #include "ima.h"
>
> /* flags definitions */
> -#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
> -#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
> +#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
> +#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
> #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
> #define IMA_UID 0x0008
> #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
> @@ -69,35 +69,35 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> * and running executables.
> */
> static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MMAP_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> - {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
> + {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
> .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
> - {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
> + {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
> .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
> - {.action = MEASURE,.func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> + {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
> };
>
> static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = DONT_APPRAISE,.fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> - {.action = APPRAISE,.fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,.flags = IMA_FOWNER},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
> + {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
> };
>
> static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
> @@ -122,12 +122,12 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
> }
> __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
>
> -/*
> +/*
> * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
> * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
> * stale LSM policy.
> *
> - * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
> + * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
> * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
> */
> static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
> @@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ retry:
> retried = 1;
> ima_lsm_update_rules();
> goto retry;
> - }
> + }
> if (!rc)
> return false;
> }
> @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
> if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
> return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
>
> - switch(func) {
> + switch (func) {
> case MMAP_CHECK:
> return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
> case BPRM_CHECK:
> @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
> measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
> appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
> ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
> -
> +
> for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
> if (i < measure_entries)
> list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
> @@ -522,8 +522,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> break;
> }
>
> - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
> - &entry->fsmagic);
> + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
> if (!result)
> entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
> break;
> @@ -549,7 +548,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> break;
> }
>
> - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
> + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
> if (!result) {
> entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
> if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
> @@ -566,7 +565,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> break;
> }
>
> - result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
> + result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
> if (!result) {
> entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
> if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> index 91128b4..552705d 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
>
> mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
> if (!violation) {
> - memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
> + memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
> if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
> audit_cause = "hash_exists";
> result = -EEXIST;
> @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
> }
>
> if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */
> - memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
> + memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
>
> tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
> if (tpmresult != 0) {
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
> index 9a4a0d1..a076a96 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
> @@ -22,20 +22,20 @@
>
> static struct ima_template_desc defined_templates[] = {
> {.name = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME, .fmt = IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT},
> - {.name = "ima-ng",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
> - {.name = "ima-sig",.fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
> + {.name = "ima-ng", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng"},
> + {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"},
> };
>
> static struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
> - {.field_id = "d",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
> + {.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
> .field_show = ima_show_template_digest},
> - {.field_id = "n",.field_init = ima_eventname_init,
> + {.field_id = "n", .field_init = ima_eventname_init,
> .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
> - {.field_id = "d-ng",.field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
> + {.field_id = "d-ng", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_ng_init,
> .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng},
> - {.field_id = "n-ng",.field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
> + {.field_id = "n-ng", .field_init = ima_eventname_ng_init,
> .field_show = ima_show_template_string},
> - {.field_id = "sig",.field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
> + {.field_id = "sig", .field_init = ima_eventsig_init,
> .field_show = ima_show_template_sig},
> };
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
> index 793d7be..aab9fa5 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
> @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
> * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
> *
> * File: integrity_audit.c
> - * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
> + * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
> */
>
> #include <linux/fs.h>
> @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
> {
> unsigned long audit;
>
> - if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
> + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &audit))
> integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
> return 1;
> }
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