On Mar 4, 2014 5:32 PM, Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
These counters help determine how often the guest sends a packet with more
than MAX_SKB_FRAGS frags.
NOTE: if bisect brought you here, you should apply the series up until #9,
s/#9/"the name of the patch.."
otherwise malicious guests can block other guests by not releasing their sent
packets.
Signed-off-by: Zoltan Kiss <zoltan.kiss@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h | 1 +
drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c | 7 +++++++
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 1 +
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
index eac171e..d8a2298 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ struct xenvif {
unsigned long tx_zerocopy_sent;
unsigned long tx_zerocopy_success;
unsigned long tx_zerocopy_fail;
+ unsigned long tx_frag_overflow;
/* Miscellaneous private stuff. */
struct net_device *dev;
diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
index adfed30..ba5be2f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/interface.c
@@ -252,6 +252,13 @@ static const struct xenvif_stat {
"tx_zerocopy_fail",
offsetof(struct xenvif, tx_zerocopy_fail)
},
+ /* Number of packets exceeding MAX_SKB_FRAG slots. You should use
+ * a guest with the same MAX_SKB_FRAG
+ */
+ {
+ "tx_frag_overflow",
+ offsetof(struct xenvif, tx_frag_overflow)
+ },
};
static int xenvif_get_sset_count(struct net_device *dev, int string_set)
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel