Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] kpatch: dynamic kernel patching
From: Josh Poimboeuf
Date: Tue May 06 2014 - 10:51:05 EST
On Tue, May 06, 2014 at 04:05:21PM +0200, Frederic Weisbecker wrote:
> On Tue, May 06, 2014 at 07:12:11AM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Mon, May 05, 2014 at 11:49:23PM +0200, Frederic Weisbecker wrote:
> > > On Mon, May 05, 2014 at 08:43:04PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > > > If a kernel refuses to patch with certain threads running, that will
> > > > drive those kernel threads being fixed and such. It's a deterministic,
> > > > recoverable, reportable bug situation, so fixing it should be fast.
> > > >
> > > > We learned these robustness lessons the hard way with kprobes and
> > > > ftrace dynamic code patching... which are utterly simple compared to
> > > > live kernel patching!
> > >
> > > Yeah, agreed. More rationale behind: we want to put the kthreads into
> > > semantic sleeps, not just random sleeping point. This way we lower the
> > > chances to execute new code messing up living state that is expecting old
> > > code after random preemption or sleeping points.
> > >
> > > But by semantic sleeps I mean more than just explicit calls to schedule()
> > > as opposed to preemption points.
> > > It also implies shutting down as well the living states handled by the kthread
> > > such that some sort of re-initialization of the state is also needed when
> > > the kthread gets back to run.
> > >
> > > And that's exactly what good implementations of kthread park provide.
> > >
> > > Consider kernel/watchdog.c as an example: when we park the lockup
> > > detector kthread, it disables the perf event and the hrtimer before it goes
> > > to actually park and sleep. When the kthread is later unparked, the kthread
> > > restarts the hrtimer and the perf event.
> > >
> > > If we live patch code that has obscure relations with perf or hrtimer here,
> > > we lower a lot the chances for a crash when the watchdog kthread is parked.
> > >
> > > So I'm in favour of parking all possible kthreads before live patching. Freezing
> > > alone doesn't provide the same state shutdown than parking.
> > >
> > > Now since parking looks more widely implemented than kthread freezing, we could
> > > even think about implementing kthread freezing using parking as backend.
> >
> > The vast majority of kernel threads on my system don't seem to know
> > anything about parking or freezing. I see one kthread function which
> > calls kthread_should_park(), which is smpboot_thread_fn(), used for
> > ksoftirqd/*, migration/* and watchdog/*. But there are many other
> > kthread functions which seem to be parking ignorant, including:
> >
> > cpu_idle_loop
> > kthreadd
> > rcu_gp_kthread
> > worker_thread
> > rescuer_thread
> > devtmpfsd
> > hub_thread
> > kswapd
> > ksm_scan_thread
> > khugepaged
> > fsnotify_mark_destroy
> > scsi_error_handler
> > kauditd_thread
> > kjournald2
> > irq_thread
> > rfcomm_run
>
> Yeah I now realize that only very few of them can park. Only infiniband, rcu,
> stop_machine and the watchdog...
>
> But that's still a good direction to take if we want to make the kernel
> step by step more robust against live patching.
>
> >
> > Maybe we could modify all these thread functions (and probably more) to
> > be park and/or freezer capable. But really it wouldn't make much of a
> > difference IMO. It would only protect careless users from a tiny
> > percentage of all possible havoc that a careless user could create.
> >
> > Live patching is a very sensitive and risky operation, and from a kernel
> > standpoint we should make it as safe as we reasonably can. But we can't
> > do much about careless users. Ultimately the risk is in the hands of
> > the user and their choice of patches. They need to absolutely
> > understand all the implications of patching a particular function.
>
> Kernel developers will be a tiny minority of users of live patching.
>
> Very few sysadmins know about kernel internals. You can't really ask them
> to judge if a patch is reasonably live patchable or not.
>
> It's possible to appreciate a patch wrt. its size, or the fact that it came
> through a stable tree, so it's at worst mildly invasive.
>
> The only thing that could make live patching safe is that a community
> eventually builds around it and carefully inspect patches in a stable release
> then provide a selection of safely live patchable pieces.
I agree, and this is exactly the approach we're taking. It's not
possible for the tools or the kernel to determine whether a patch is
safe. We don't expect a sysadmin to make that determination either. We
have to rely on kernel experts to analyze the patches, test them, and
then deliver them (or the binary patch modules) to the sysadmin.
> Other than that, expect people to do crazy things.
Yes. This is why we taint the kernel with TAINT_KPATCH.
> > If the patch changes the way a function interacts with some external data,
> > then they're starting to tempt fate and they need to be extra careful.
> > This care needs to be taken for *all* kernel functions, not just for the
> > few that are called from kernel threads.
>
> It's actually very hard to tell if a given function isn't called by any
> kernel thread.
I agree. The point I was trying to make is that the user needs to be
very careful with analyzing the patch, regardless of whether the
function is called by a kernel thread.
> > Also, the top level kernel thread functions (like those listed above)
> > will never be patchable anyway, because we never patch an in-use
> > function (these functions are always in the threads' backtraces). This
> > further diminishes the benefit of parking/freezing kernel threads.
>
> You're right to do some basic prevention. It's the bare minimum.
>
> But keep in mind it's a tiny protection if you consider the top level
> function is only a small part of what is called by a kernel thread. And
> there is still a risk that the patched part is incompatible with previously
> executed code. For example when a patched function depends on a patched
> initialization but we executed the old version of the initialization already
> and we are going to execute the new patched function. It's actually a common
> pattern. And careful implementation of kthreads parking can help. But this is
> something that we can do step by step.
We prevent many situations like this by disallowing the user from
patching __init functions when building the patch module binary.
> Ah this reminds me when we chased kprobes dangerous spots and we tried to
> declare __kprobes the functions which were too dangerous to hot patch.
>
> We eventually gave up because it was impossible to fix everything. And that
> was only for kprobes!
>
> So you can never tell if a given patch will impact a given kthread.
If the user (or the person creating the patch for them) doesn't
understand all impacts of the patch, they have no business patching
their kernel with it.
--
Josh
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