Re: [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
>> >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> >>
>> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
>> >>
>> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
>> >>
>> >> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
>> >> rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...
>> >>
>> >> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> >> ---
>> >>  kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
>> >>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>> >
>> > Did this patch get dropped somewhere?  Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I
>> > miss a later conversation about this?
>>
>> Hmm.  It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree.  Crap.
>>
>> IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to
>> security@.
>
> That seems to be my mbox at times :)
>
> But yes, having something "real" might be good if the load gets higher,
> right now it's so low that my "sweep pending security patches" task
> usually catches anything pending, which is rare.
>

There are currently at least two issues that I reported that are stuck
in limbo: this one and the (not-yet-public) vfs thing.  And there's
the CVE-2014-0181 regression fix that almost got forgotten, but that
isn't really a security issue.

And I can't read your mbox :-/

--Andy
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