Re: [PATCH 1/2] auditsc: audit_krule mask accesses need bounds checking

[Greg KH]

On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 05:30:19PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 5:32 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:55:20PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> > On Mon, Jun 09, 2014 at 03:35:02PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> >> >> On Mon, Jun 9, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> >> > On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 11:09:58PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> >> >> >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Fixes an easy DoS and possible information disclosure.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> This does nothing about the broken state of x32 auditing.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> eparis: If the admin has enabled auditd and has specifically loaded audit
> >> >> >> rules.  This bug has been around since before git.  Wow...
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> >> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >> >> >> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >> >> >> ---
> >> >> >>  kernel/auditsc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++---------
> >> >> >>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >> >> >
> >> >> > Did this patch get dropped somewhere?  Isn't it a valid bugfix, or did I
> >> >> > miss a later conversation about this?
> >> >>
> >> >> Hmm.  It seems that it didn't make it into Linus' tree.  Crap.
> >> >>
> >> >> IMO we need some kind of real tracking system for issues reported to
> >> >> security@.
> >> >
> >> > That seems to be my mbox at times :)
> >> >
> >> > But yes, having something "real" might be good if the load gets higher,
> >> > right now it's so low that my "sweep pending security patches" task
> >> > usually catches anything pending, which is rare.
> >> >
> >>
> >> There are currently at least two issues that I reported that are stuck
> >> in limbo: this one and the (not-yet-public) vfs thing.
> >
> > That was next on my list to poke people about...
> >
> >> And there's the CVE-2014-0181 regression fix that almost got
> >> forgotten, but that isn't really a security issue.
> >
> > What is that, where was that reported?
> 
> commit 2d7a85f4b06e9c27ff629f07a524c48074f07f81
> Author: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Date:   Fri May 30 11:04:00 2014 -0700
> 
>     netlink: Only check file credentials for implicit destinations
> 
> 
> The security issue got fixed quickly, but the fix turned out to be problematic.

Ah, thanks, I rely on Dave to send me networking stable patches, I'm
sure he's on this...
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