[PATCH 1/2] tmon: Check log file for common secuirty issues

[Neil Horman]

The tmon logging system blindly opens its log file on a static path, making it
very easy for someone to redirect that log information to inappropriate places
or overwrite other users data.  Do some easy checking to make sure we're not
logging to a symlink or a file owned by another user.

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CC: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@xxxxxxxxx>
CC: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 tools/thermal/tmon/tmon.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/thermal/tmon/tmon.c b/tools/thermal/tmon/tmon.c
index b30f531..059e0be 100644
--- a/tools/thermal/tmon/tmon.c
+++ b/tools/thermal/tmon/tmon.c
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static void start_syslog(void)
 static void prepare_logging(void)
 {
 	int i;
+	struct stat logstat;
 
 	if (!logging)
 		return;
@@ -152,6 +153,29 @@ static void prepare_logging(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (lstat(TMON_LOG_FILE, &logstat) < 0) {
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "Unable to stat log file %s\n", TMON_LOG_FILE);
+		fclose(tmon_log);
+		tmon_log = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* The log file must be a regular file owned by us */
+	if (S_ISLNK(logstat.st_mode)) {
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "Log file is a symlink.  Will not log\n");
+		fclose(tmon_log);
+		tmon_log = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (logstat.st_uid != getuid()) {
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "We don't own the log file.  Not logging\n");
+		fclose(tmon_log);
+		tmon_log = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
+
+
 	fprintf(tmon_log, "#----------- THERMAL SYSTEM CONFIG -------------\n");
 	for (i = 0; i < ptdata.nr_tz_sensor; i++) {
 		char binding_str[33]; /* size of long + 1 */
-- 
1.8.3.1

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