[PATCH] procfs: silence lockdep warning about read vs. exec seq_file
From: Kirill A. Shutemov
Date: Wed Jul 30 2014 - 17:59:52 EST
Testcase:
cat /proc/self/maps >/dev/null
chmod +x /proc/self/net/packet
exec /proc/self/net/packet
It triggers lockdep warning:
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.16.0-rc7-00064-g26bcd8b72563 #8 Not tainted
-------------------------------------------------------
sh/157 is trying to acquire lock:
(&p->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8117f4f8>] seq_read+0x38/0x3e0
but task is already holding lock:
(&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81160018>] prepare_bprm_creds+0x28/0x90
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}:
[<ffffffff8109a9c1>] __lock_acquire+0x531/0xde0
[<ffffffff8109b959>] lock_acquire+0x79/0xd0
[<ffffffff8173f838>] mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x68/0x460
[<ffffffff811c0d9f>] lock_trace+0x1f/0x60
[<ffffffff811c0ed7>] proc_pid_personality+0x17/0x60
[<ffffffff811be39b>] proc_single_show+0x4b/0x90
[<ffffffff8117f5a0>] seq_read+0xe0/0x3e0
[<ffffffff81158f1e>] vfs_read+0x8e/0x170
[<ffffffff81159be8>] SyS_read+0x48/0xc0
[<ffffffff81743712>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
-> #0 (&p->lock){+.+.+.}:
[<ffffffff81097437>] validate_chain.isra.37+0xfe7/0x13b0
[<ffffffff8109a9c1>] __lock_acquire+0x531/0xde0
[<ffffffff8109b959>] lock_acquire+0x79/0xd0
[<ffffffff8173f09a>] mutex_lock_nested+0x6a/0x3d0
[<ffffffff8117f4f8>] seq_read+0x38/0x3e0
[<ffffffff811bd5f3>] proc_reg_read+0x43/0x70
[<ffffffff81158f1e>] vfs_read+0x8e/0x170
[<ffffffff8115ea13>] kernel_read+0x43/0x60
[<ffffffff8115ec65>] prepare_binprm+0xd5/0x170
[<ffffffff811605c8>] do_execve_common.isra.32+0x548/0x800
[<ffffffff81160893>] do_execve+0x13/0x20
[<ffffffff81160b70>] SyS_execve+0x20/0x30
[<ffffffff81743c89>] stub_execve+0x69/0xa0
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
lock(&p->lock);
lock(&sig->cred_guard_mutex);
lock(&p->lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by sh/157:
#0: (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81160018>] prepare_bprm_creds+0x28/0x90
It's a false positive: seq files which take cred_guard_mutex are never
executable. Let's use separate lock class for them.
I don't know why we allow "chmod +x" on some proc files, notably net-related.
Is it a bug?
Also I suspect eb94cd96e05d fixes non-existing bug, like this one.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
fs/proc/task_nommu.c | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 2d696b0c93bf..c05b4a227acb 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -655,9 +655,31 @@ static int proc_single_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
return ret;
}
+/*
+ * proc_pid_personality() and proc_pid_stack() take cred_guard_mutex via
+ * lock_trace() with seq_file->lock held.
+ * execve(2) calls vfs_read() with cred_guard_mutex held.
+ *
+ * So if you will try to execute a seq_file, lockdep will report a possible
+ * circular locking dependency. It's false-positive, since ONE() files are
+ * never executable.
+ *
+ * Let's set separate lock class for seq_file->lock of ONE() files.
+ */
+static struct lock_class_key proc_single_open_lock_class;
+
static int proc_single_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
- return single_open(filp, proc_single_show, inode);
+ struct seq_file *m;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = single_open(filp, proc_single_show, inode);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ m = filp->private_data;
+ lockdep_set_class(&m->lock, &proc_single_open_lock_class);
+ return 0;
}
static const struct file_operations proc_single_file_operations = {
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
index cfa63ee92c96..536b9f9a9ff5 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_mmu.c
@@ -19,6 +19,18 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include "internal.h"
+/*
+ * m_start() takes cred_guard_mutex via mm_access() with seq_file->lock held.
+ * execve(2) calls vfs_read() with cred_guard_mutex held.
+ *
+ * So if you will try to execute a seq_file, lockdep will report a possible
+ * circular locking dependency. It's false positive, since m_start() users are
+ * never executable.
+ *
+ * Let's set separate class lock for seq_file->lock of m_start() users.
+ */
+static struct lock_class_key pid_maps_seq_file_lock;
+
void task_mem(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long data, text, lib, swap;
@@ -242,6 +254,7 @@ static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
ret = seq_open(file, ops);
if (!ret) {
struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
+ lockdep_set_class(&m->lock, &pid_maps_seq_file_lock);
m->private = priv;
} else {
kfree(priv);
@@ -1512,6 +1525,7 @@ static int numa_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
ret = seq_open(file, ops);
if (!ret) {
struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
+ lockdep_set_class(&m->lock, &pid_maps_seq_file_lock);
m->private = priv;
} else {
kfree(priv);
diff --git a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
index 678455d2d683..35a799443990 100644
--- a/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
+++ b/fs/proc/task_nommu.c
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include "internal.h"
+/* See comment in task_mmu.c */
+static struct lock_class_key pid_maps_seq_file_lock;
+
/*
* Logic: we've got two memory sums for each process, "shared", and
* "non-shared". Shared memory may get counted more than once, for
@@ -277,6 +280,7 @@ static int maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
ret = seq_open(file, ops);
if (!ret) {
struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
+ lockdep_set_class(&m->lock, &pid_maps_seq_file_lock);
m->private = priv;
} else {
kfree(priv);
--
Kirill A. Shutemov
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