Re: [PATCH v3] KVM: nVMX: nested TPR shadow/threshold emulation

From: Paolo Bonzini
Date: Thu Aug 07 2014 - 10:05:59 EST

Il 06/08/2014 08:38, Zhang, Yang Z ha scritto:
> Paolo Bonzini wrote on 2014-08-05:
>> Il 05/08/2014 09:56, Zhang, Yang Z ha scritto:
>>> Wanpeng Li wrote on 2014-08-04:
>>>> This patch fix bug
>>>> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=61411
>>>>
>>>> TPR shadow/threshold feature is important to speed up the Windows guest.
>>>> Besides, it is a must feature for certain VMM.
>>>>
>>>> We map virtual APIC page address and TPR threshold from L1 VMCS. If
>>>> TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD VM exit is triggered by L2 guest and L1
>>>> interested in, we inject it into L1 VMM for handling.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> ---
>>>> v2 -> v3:
>>>> * nested vm entry failure if both tpr shadow and cr8 exiting bits
>>>> are not set
>>>> v1 -> v2:
>>>> * don't take L0's "virtualize APIC accesses" setting into account *
>>>> virtual_apic_page do exactly the same thing that is done for
>>>> apic_access_page * add the tpr threshold field to the read-write
>>>> fields for shadow
>>>> VMCS
>>>>
>>>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>>>> 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index
>>>> c604f3c..7a56e2c 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>>> @@ -379,6 +379,7 @@ struct nested_vmx {
>>>> * we must keep them pinned while L2 runs. */ struct page
>>>> *apic_access_page; + struct page *virtual_apic_page; u64
>>>> msr_ia32_feature_control;
>>>>
>>>> struct hrtimer preemption_timer; @@ -533,6 +534,7 @@ static int
>>>> max_shadow_read_only_fields = ARRAY_SIZE(shadow_read_only_fields);
>>>>
>>>> static unsigned long shadow_read_write_fields[] = { + TPR_THRESHOLD,
>>>> GUEST_RIP, GUEST_RSP, GUEST_CR0,
>>>> @@ -2330,7 +2332,7 @@ static __init void
>>>> nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(void)
>>>> CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING | CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |
>>>> CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS | CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING |
>>>> CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING | CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING |
>>>> - CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING |
>>>> + CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING | CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |
>>>> CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS; /* * We can allow some
>>>> features even when not supported by the @@ -6148,6 +6150,10 @@ static
>>>> void free_nested(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>>> nested_release_page(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
>>>> vmx->nested.apic_access_page = 0; }
>>>> + if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page) {
>>>> + nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
>>>> + vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page = 0;
>>>> + }
>>>>
>>>> nested_free_all_saved_vmcss(vmx); } @@ -6936,7 +6942,7 @@ static
>>>> bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) case
>>>> EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY: return 0; case
>>>> EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
>>>> - return 1;
>>>> + return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
>>>> case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
>>>> return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
>>>> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
>>>> @@ -7057,6 +7063,9 @@ static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu
>>>> *vcpu)
>>>>
>>>> static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr,
>>>> int
>>>> irr) {
>>>> + if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
>>>> + return;
>>>> +
>>>> if (irr == -1 || tpr < irr) {
>>>> vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0);
>>>> return;
>>>> @@ -8024,6 +8033,27 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu
>>>> *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>>> exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING;
>>>> exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
>>>> exec_control |= vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
>>>> + if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
>>>> + nested_release_page(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
>>>> + vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page =
>>>> + nested_get_page(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr);
>>>> + if (!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page)
>>>> + exec_control &=
>>>> + ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
>>>> + else
>>>> + vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
>>>> + page_to_phys(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page));
>>>> +
>>>> + if (!(exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) &&
>>>> + !((exec_control & CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING) &&
>>>> + (exec_control & CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING)))
>>>> + nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
>>>> VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
>>>
>>> I think this is not correct. The vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page may not
>>> valid due to two reasons: 1. The virtual_apic_page_addr is not a valid
>>> gfn. In this case, the vmx failure
>> must be injected to L1 unconditionally regardless of the setting of
>> CR8 load/store exiting.
>>
>> You're right that accesses to the APIC-access page may also end up
>> writing to the virtual-APIC page. Hence, if the "virtualize APIC
>> accesses" setting is 1 in the secondary exec controls, you also have to fail the vmentry.
>>
>> Doing it unconditionally is not correct, but it is the simplest thing
>
> Why not correct?

On real hardware you could point the virtual-APIC page to an invalid
address. If CR8 load exits are enabled, CR8 store exits are enabled,
and virtualize APIC access is disabled, the processor would never notice.

But it's okay with a comment.

>>>> +
>>>> + vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, vmcs12->tpr_threshold);
>>>> + }
>>>
>>> Miss else here:
>>> If L2 owns the APIC and doesn't use TPR_SHADOW, we need to setup the
>>> vmcs02 based on vmcs01. For example, if vmcs01 is using TPR_SHADOW,
>>> then
>>> vmcs02 must set it. Also, we need to use vmcs01's virtual_apic_page
>>> and TPR_THRESHOLD for vmcs02.
>>
>> What do you mean by "owns the APIC"?
>
> Means if L2 touch L1's APIC directly, for example, if L2 not using
> TPR_SHADOW, then move to/from CR8 will touch L1's TPR directly. And in
> this case, L0 should aware of L1's TRP change.

You're right.

Paolo
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