Re: [PATCH 2/3] Smack: handle zero-length security labels without panic

From: Serge E. Hallyn
Date: Fri Aug 08 2014 - 16:54:42 EST

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Quoting Konstantin Khlebnikov (koct9i@xxxxxxxxx):
> On Sat, Aug 9, 2014 at 12:25 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Quoting Konstantin Khlebnikov (k.khlebnikov@xxxxxxxxxxx):
> >> Zero-length security labels are invalid but kernel should handle them.
> >>
> >> This patch fixes kernel panic after setting zero-length security labels:
> >> # attr -S -s "SMACK64" -V "" file
> >>
> >> And after writing zero-length string into smackfs files syslog and onlycp:
> >> # python -c 'import os; os.write(1, "")' > /smack/syslog
> >>
> >> The problem is caused by brain-damaged logic in function smk_parse_smack()
> >> which takes pointer to buffer and its length but if length below or equal zero
> >> it thinks that the buffer is zero-terminated. Unfortunately callers of this
> >> function are widely used and proper fix requires serious refactoring.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> >>
> >> ---
> >>
> >> Example:
> >>
> >> [ 28.063935] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
> >> [ 28.064623] IP: [<ffffffff812ea780>] strlen+0x0/0x30
> >> [ 28.064623] PGD 29a77067 PUD 2972d067 PMD 0
> >> [ 28.064623] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> >> [ 28.064623] Modules linked in:
> >> [ 28.064623] CPU: 0 PID: 824 Comm: attr Not tainted 3.16.0+ #6
> >> [ 28.064623] task: ffff880029bd88c0 ti: ffff8800297d0000 task.ti: ffff8800297d0000
> >> [ 28.064623] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812ea780>] [<ffffffff812ea780>] strlen+0x0/0x30
> >> [ 28.064623] RSP: 0018:ffff8800297d3ca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
> >> [ 28.064623] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880029c096c0 RCX: 0000000000000001
> >> [ 28.064623] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
> >> [ 28.064623] RBP: ffff8800297d3cd0 R08: ffffffff81e3d940 R09: ffff88002a3e8588
> >> [ 28.064623] R10: 8080808080808080 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
> >> [ 28.064623] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> >> [ 28.064623] FS: 00007effe391a700(0000) GS:ffff88002a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> >> [ 28.064623] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> >> [ 28.064623] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000297a1000 CR4: 00000000001406b0
> >> [ 28.064623] Stack:
> >> [ 28.064623] ffffffff812a6fa5 ffff880029c096c0 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
> >> [ 28.064623] 0000000000000000 ffff8800297d3cf8 ffffffff812a70ae ffff880029c096c0
> >> [ 28.064623] 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffff8800297d3d88 ffffffff812a64dc
> >> [ 28.064623] Call Trace:
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff812a6fa5>] ? smk_parse_smack+0xe5/0x110
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff812a70ae>] smk_import_entry+0xe/0x130
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff812a64dc>] smack_inode_setxattr+0x11c/0x280
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff8116a767>] ? lookup_fast+0x177/0x2e0
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff81177001>] ? dput+0x21/0x1a0
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff812a0eeb>] security_inode_setxattr+0x1b/0x30
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff8118488f>] vfs_setxattr+0x6f/0xb0
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff81184a76>] setxattr+0x1a6/0x1f0
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff8116af6d>] ? final_putname+0x1d/0x40
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff8116b1c4>] ? putname+0x24/0x40
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff8117144a>] ? user_path_at_empty+0x5a/0xa0
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff81162b84>] ? __sb_start_write+0x44/0xe0
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff8113cd21>] ? do_brk+0x241/0x320
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff81184d97>] SyS_lsetxattr+0x87/0xe0
> >> [ 28.064623] [<ffffffff81806f69>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
> >> [ 28.064623] Code: 89 f8 48 89 e5 f6 82 40 3e a6 81 20 74 15 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 c0 01 0f b6 10 f6 82 40 3e a6 81 20 75 f0 5d c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 <80> 3f 00 55 48 89 e5 74 15 48 89 f8 0f 1f 40 00 48 83 c0 01 80
> >> [ 28.064623] RIP [<ffffffff812ea780>] strlen+0x0/0x30
> >> [ 28.064623] RSP <ffff8800297d3ca8>
> >> [ 28.064623] CR2: 0000000000000000
> >> [ 28.093561] ---[ end trace de1055429a98a5be ]---
> >> ---
> >> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +-
> >> security/smack/smackfs.c | 4 ++--
> >> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> >> index b11ab23..afa5ad0 100644
> >> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> >> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> >> @@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> >> rc = -EPERM;
> >>
> >> if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
> >> - skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
> >> + skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
> >> if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
> >> (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
> >> rc = -EINVAL;
> >> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> >> index 3c720ff..56a1439 100644
> >> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> >> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> >> @@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> >> if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp)
> >> return -EPERM;
> >>
> >> - data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> + data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> if (data == NULL)
> >> return -ENOMEM;
> >>
> >> @@ -2228,7 +2228,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> >> if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
> >> return -EPERM;
> >>
> >
> > How about putting a comment here explaining that this way if len is 0 you
> > make sure to have '\0' to avoid parsing problems?
>
> There are plenty of these comments. That design is uncommon and

Exactly why it should be documented.

> extremely dangerous,
> it cannot be neutralized just by a comment.

It's not about neutralizing it. It's about down the road, while you're on leave
for a few months, someone saying "say that +1 seems unnecessary, I'll just remove it."

> Probably magic length '0' might be replaced with magic '-1' which is much safer.

Could be.

> >
> >> - data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> + data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> if (data == NULL)
> >> return -ENOMEM;
> >>
> > --
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Next message: Kamal Mostafa: "[PATCH 3.13 111/259] perf/x86/intel: ignore CondChgd bit to avoid false NMI handling"
Previous message: Kamal Mostafa: "[PATCH 3.13 105/259] parisc: drop unused defines and header includes"
In reply to: Konstantin Khlebnikov: "Re: [PATCH 2/3] Smack: handle zero-length security labels without panic"
Next in thread: Casey Schaufler: "Re: [PATCH 2/3] Smack: handle zero-length security labels without panic"
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