Re: [PATCH] x86 : Ensure X86_FLAGS_NT is cleared on syscall entry
From: Sebastian Lackner
Date: Mon Sep 29 2014 - 14:30:57 EST
On 29.09.2014 19:40, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On 09/25/2014 12:42 PM, Anish Bhatt wrote:
>> The MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, which is responsible for clearing specific EFLAGS on
>> syscall entry, should also clear the nested task (NT) flag to be safe from
>> userspace injection. Without this fix the application segmentation
>> faults on syscall return because of the changed meaning of the IRET
>> Further details can be seen here https://bugs.winehq.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33275
>> Signed-off-by: Anish Bhatt <anish@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Lackner <sebastian@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +-
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
>> index e4ab2b4..3126558 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
>> @@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ void syscall_init(void)
>> /* Flags to clear on syscall */
>> - X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_AC);
>> + X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_AC|X86_EFLAGS_NT);
> Something's weird here, and at the very least the changelog is
> insufficiently informative.
> The Intel SDM says:
> If the NT flag is set and the processor is in IA-32e mode, the IRET
> instruction causes a general protection exception.
> Presumably interrupt delivery clears NT. I haven't spotted where that's
> documented yet.
Well, the best documentation I've found is something like
--- snip ---
TF := 0;
NT := 0;
--- snip ---
(Doesn't say anything about HW interrupts though)
This also makes sense at my opinion, since the interrupt handler has to know if it should return
to the previous task (when NT=1) or to the same task (when NT=0).
> sysret doesn't appear to care about NT at all.
> So: the test code doesn't appear to do anything interesting *unless* it
> goes through syscall followed by the iret exit path. Then it receives
> #GP on return, which turns into a signal.
Yep, thats also my interpretation of this issue. If the processor would be in 32-bit/protected-mode the
NT flag would be interpreted as a task return, and it would probably cause a different exception,
because the kernel never uses the task link property of the TSS.
> On the premise that the slow and fast return paths ought to be
> indistinguishable from userspace, I think we should fix this. But I
> want to understand it better first.
A reliable way to force the slow return path is to use ptrace, see:
This also matches the experience: The test application only crashes with a small probability,
except you use strace, then it will always crash (because the kernel forces the slow return path).
Two additional remarks:
* A reliable way to let it crash without strace, is to run the fork()/clone() syscall afterwards and
compile as 32-bit.
* When you run exec*() afterwards, the crash will happen at the entry of the new executable. Doesn't
matter if the target process is SUID or not. I don't see a way to exploit this issue, though, but
probably some more people should take a look at it...
> Also, 32-bit may need more care here.
That might be possible. It probably makes sense to review other parts of the code, for similar issues.
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