Re: [PATCH 08/13] KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys

From: Dmitry Kasatkin
Date: Thu Oct 02 2014 - 12:04:58 EST

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In reply to: Dmitry Kasatkin: "Re: [PATCH 08/13] KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys"
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On 02/10/14 18:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> Hi David,
>
> I just took latest #next branch from James's security tree which
> includes latest KEYs patches and noticed following:
>
> [ 9.812332] Request for unknown module key 'Magrathea: Glacier
> signing key: 926305d6dda66f47139eb4e3cb25a6adef527f08' err -11
>
> Also I noticed that output of 'keyctl show' and 'cat /proc/keys' output
> also has changed in respect of certificate ids..
>
> Those ids does not look any close to my kernel X509 X509v3 Subject Key
> Identifier, which is:
> 92:63:05:D6:DD:A6:6F:47:13:9E:B4:E3:CB:25:A6:AD:EF:52:7F:08
>
> proc/keys shows
>
> symmetri Magrathea: Glacier signing key: d9e2e4c6951f1e83: X509.RSA
> 6865612e68326732 []
>
> Very different ids..
>
> How could I match certificate now?
> Module verification code cannot find needed key..
>
> - Dmitry

Hehe. Also now I get kernel Oops in asymmetric_key_id_same...

-------------------------
[ 132.816522] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
ffffffffffffffea
[ 132.819902] IP: [<ffffffff812bfc20>] asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
[ 132.820302] PGD 1a12067 PUD 1a14067 PMD 0
[ 132.820302] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 132.820302] Modules linked in: bridge(E) stp(E) llc(E) evdev(E)
serio_raw(E) i2c_piix4(E) button(E) fuse(E)
[ 132.820302] CPU: 0 PID: 2993 Comm: cat Tainted: G E
3.16.0-kds+ #2847
[ 132.820302] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 132.820302] task: ffff88004249a430 ti: ffff880056640000 task.ti:
ffff880056640000
[ 132.820302] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812bfc20>] [<ffffffff812bfc20>]
asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
[ 132.820302] RSP: 0018:ffff880056643930 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 132.820302] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffffffffea RCX:
ffff880056643ae0
[ 132.820302] RDX: 000000000000005e RSI: ffffffffffffffea RDI:
ffff88005bac9300
[ 132.820302] RBP: ffff880056643948 R08: 0000000000000003 R09:
00000007504aa01a
[ 132.820302] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
ffff88005d68ca40
[ 132.820302] R13: 0000000000000101 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
ffff88005bac5280
[ 132.820302] FS: 00007f67a153c740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 132.820302] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 132.820302] CR2: ffffffffffffffea CR3: 000000002e663000 CR4:
00000000000006f0
[ 132.820302] Stack:
[ 132.820302] ffffffff812bfc66 ffff880056643ae0 ffff88005bac5280
ffff880056643958
[ 132.820302] ffffffff812bfc9d ffff880056643980 ffffffff812971d9
ffff88005ce930c1
[ 132.820302] ffff88005ce930c0 0000000000000000 ffff8800566439c8
ffffffff812fb753
[ 132.820302] Call Trace:
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc66>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x24/0x42
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc9d>] asymmetric_key_cmp+0x19/0x1b
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812971d9>] keyring_search_iterator+0x74/0xd7
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812fb753>] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x67/0xd2
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812fbaa1>] assoc_array_iterate+0x19/0x1e
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297332>] search_nested_keyrings+0xf6/0x2b6
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810728da>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x91/0xa2
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810860d2>] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x6e
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810a137d>] ? current_kernel_time+0x77/0xb8
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297871>] keyring_search_aux+0xe1/0x14c
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812977fc>] ? keyring_search_aux+0x6c/0x14c
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff8129796b>] keyring_search+0x8f/0xb6
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc84>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x42/0x42
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ab9e3>] asymmetric_verify+0xa4/0x214
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ab90e>] integrity_digsig_verify+0xb1/0xe2
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812abe41>] ? evm_verifyxattr+0x6a/0x7a
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812b0390>] ima_appraise_measurement+0x160/0x370
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81161db2>] ? d_absolute_path+0x5b/0x7a
[ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ada30>] process_measurement+0x322/0x404

> On 08/09/14 18:38, David Howells wrote:
>> Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification
>> when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made:
>>
>> (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following
>> key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message:
>>
>> id: serial number + issuer
>> skid: subjKeyId + subject
>> authority: authKeyId + issuer
>>
>> (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an
>> asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present).
>>
>> (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches:
>>
>> (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The
>> prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to
>> search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs
>> recorded on the key.
>>
>> (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will
>> look for an exact match on the key description.
>>
>> (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted
>> into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing
>> will turn it back into a binary ID.
>>
>> (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks
>> up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate
>> signature.
>>
>> (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a
>> key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information
>> block signature.
>>
>> Additional changes:
>>
>> (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the
>> cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG.
>>
>> (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP
>> public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should
>> generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint.
>>
>> (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and
>> used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the
>> actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
>> ---
>>
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 4 -
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 133 ++++++++++++-----------------
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 38 ++++++--
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 5 -
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 6 -
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 44 ++++------
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 55 +++++++-----
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 5 +
>> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 89 +++++++++++--------
>> include/crypto/public_key.h | 5 +
>> 10 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
>> index 917be6b985e7..fd21ac28e0a0 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
>> @@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
>> * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
>> */
>>
>> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
>> extern bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,
>> const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id);
>>
>> extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
>>
>> -static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
>> +static inline
>> +const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
>> {
>> return key->type_data.p[1];
>> }
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>> index 3bc71b4e1eed..6f16f647d21b 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>> @@ -105,76 +105,15 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
>> }
>>
>> /*
>> - * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
>> - * @id: key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
>> - */
>> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
>> -{
>> - size_t idlen, kidlen;
>> -
>> - if (!kid || !id)
>> - return 0;
>> -
>> - /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
>> - if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
>> - id += 3;
>> -
>> - /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
>> - idlen = strlen(id);
>> - kidlen = strlen(kid);
>> - if (idlen > kidlen)
>> - return 0;
>> -
>> - kid += kidlen - idlen;
>> - if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
>> - return 0;
>> -
>> - return 1;
>> -}
>> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
>> -
>> -/*
>> - * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
>> - * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow:
>> - *
>> - * "<desc>" - request a key by description
>> - * "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID
>> - * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype
>> + * Match asymmetric keys by ID.
>> */
>> static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
>> const struct key_match_data *match_data)
>> {
>> - const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
>> - const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
>> - const char *spec = description;
>> - const char *id;
>> - ptrdiff_t speclen;
>> -
>> - if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
>> - return 0;
>> -
>> - /* See if the full key description matches as is */
>> - if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
>> - return 1;
>> -
>> - /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
>> - * specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
>> - */
>> - id = strchr(spec, ':');
>> - if (!id)
>> - return 0;
>> -
>> - speclen = id - spec;
>> - id++;
>> -
>> - if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
>> - return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
>> + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
>>
>> - if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
>> - memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
>> - return 1;
>> -
>> - return 0;
>> + return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id);
>> }
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -191,8 +130,30 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
>> */
>> static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>> {
>> - match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
>> + const char *spec = match_data->raw_data;
>> + const char *id;
>> +
>> + if (!spec || !*spec)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + if (spec[0] == 'i' &&
>> + spec[1] == 'd' &&
>> + spec[2] == ':') {
>> + id = spec + 3;
>> + } else {
>> + goto default_match;
>> + }
>> +
>> + match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id);
>> + if (!match_id)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> + match_data->preparsed = match_id;
>> match_data->cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp;
>> + match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> +default_match:
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -201,6 +162,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>> */
>> static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>> {
>> + kfree(match_data->preparsed);
>> }
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -209,8 +171,10 @@ static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>> static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
>> {
>> const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
>> - const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
>> - size_t n;
>> + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>> + const unsigned char *p;
>> + int n;
>>
>> seq_puts(m, key->description);
>>
>> @@ -218,13 +182,16 @@ static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
>> seq_puts(m, ": ");
>> subtype->describe(key, m);
>>
>> - if (kid) {
>> + if (kids && kids->id[0]) {
>> + kid = kids->id[0];
>> seq_putc(m, ' ');
>> - n = strlen(kid);
>> - if (n <= 8)
>> - seq_puts(m, kid);
>> - else
>> - seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8);
>> + n = kid->len;
>> + p = kid->data;
>> + if (n > 8) {
>> + p += n - 8;
>> + n = 8;
>> + }
>> + seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p);
>> }
>>
>> seq_puts(m, " [");
>> @@ -275,6 +242,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>> static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>> {
>> struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0];
>> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1];
>>
>> pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
>>
>> @@ -282,7 +250,11 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>> subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
>> module_put(subtype->owner);
>> }
>> - kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
>> + if (kids) {
>> + kfree(kids->id[0]);
>> + kfree(kids->id[1]);
>> + kfree(kids);
>> + }
>> kfree(prep->description);
>> }
>>
>> @@ -292,13 +264,20 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>> static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
>> {
>> struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
>> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1];
>> +
>> if (subtype) {
>> subtype->destroy(key->payload.data);
>> module_put(subtype->owner);
>> key->type_data.p[0] = NULL;
>> }
>> - kfree(key->type_data.p[1]);
>> - key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
>> +
>> + if (kids) {
>> + kfree(kids->id[0]);
>> + kfree(kids->id[1]);
>> + kfree(kids);
>> + key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
>> + }
>> }
>>
>> struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
>> index 459d2077c61b..ad6ae9d7c884 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
>> @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
>> enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
>> unsigned x509_index;
>> unsigned sinfo_index;
>> + const void *raw_serial;
>> + unsigned raw_serial_size;
>> + unsigned raw_issuer_size;
>> + const void *raw_issuer;
>> };
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
>> if (sinfo) {
>> mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
>> kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
>> + kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id);
>> kfree(sinfo);
>> }
>> }
>> @@ -256,10 +261,10 @@ int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>> if (IS_ERR(x509))
>> return PTR_ERR(x509);
>>
>> - pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
>> - pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
>> -
>> x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
>> + pr_debug("Got cert %u for %s\n", x509->index, x509->subject);
>> + pr_debug("- fingerprint %*phN\n", x509->id->len, x509->id->data);
>> +
>> *ctx->ppcerts = x509;
>> ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
>> return 0;
>> @@ -348,8 +353,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
>> {
>> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
>> + ctx->raw_serial = value;
>> + ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen;
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -361,8 +366,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
>> {
>> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
>> - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
>> + ctx->raw_issuer = value;
>> + ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -395,10 +400,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
>> {
>> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
>> -
>> - ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
>> - *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
>> - ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
>> + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>> +
>> + /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
>> + ctx->raw_serial_size,
>> + ctx->raw_issuer,
>> + ctx->raw_issuer_size);
>> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
>> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
>> +
>> + sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
>> + sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
>> + *ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
>> + ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
>> ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
>> if (!ctx->sinfo)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
>> index d25f4d15370f..91949f92bc72 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
>> @@ -33,10 +33,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
>> const void *authattrs;
>>
>> /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
>> - const void *raw_serial;
>> - unsigned raw_serial_size;
>> - unsigned raw_issuer_size;
>> - const void *raw_issuer;
>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
>>
>> /* Message signature.
>> *
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
>> index e666eb011a85..4e8dd7214753 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
>> @@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
>> * keys.
>> */
>> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject,
>> - x509->fingerprint);
>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id);
>> if (!IS_ERR(key))
>> /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
>> * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
>> @@ -82,8 +81,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> return -ENOKEY;
>> }
>>
>> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer,
>> - last->authority);
>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority);
>> if (IS_ERR(key))
>> return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
>> x509 = last;
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>> index c62cf8006e1f..57e90fa17f2b 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>> @@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> struct x509_certificate *x509;
>> unsigned certix = 1;
>>
>> - kenter("%u,%u,%u",
>> - sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
>> + kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
>>
>> for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
>> /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
>> @@ -140,21 +139,11 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
>> * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
>> */
>> - if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
>> - memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
>> - sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
>> + if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id))
>> continue;
>> pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
>> sinfo->index, certix);
>>
>> - if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
>> - memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
>> - sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
>> - pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n",
>> - sinfo->index);
>> - continue;
>> - }
>> -
>> if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
>> pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
>> sinfo->index);
>> @@ -164,8 +153,10 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> sinfo->signer = x509;
>> return 0;
>> }
>> +
>> pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
>> - sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
>> + sinfo->index,
>> + sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data);
>> return -ENOKEY;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -184,7 +175,9 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> p->seen = false;
>>
>> for (;;) {
>> - pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
>> + pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
>> + x509->subject,
>> + x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
>> x509->seen = true;
>> ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> @@ -192,7 +185,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>
>> pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
>> if (x509->authority)
>> - pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
>> + pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
>> + x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>>
>> if (!x509->authority ||
>> strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
>> @@ -218,13 +212,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
>> * list to see if the next one is there.
>> */
>> - pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
>> + pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
>> + x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>> for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
>> - pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
>> - if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
>> - strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
>> - memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
>> - x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
>> + if (!p->skid)
>> + continue;
>> + pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
>> + p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
>> + if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
>> goto found_issuer;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -233,7 +228,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> return 0;
>>
>> found_issuer:
>> - pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
>> + pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
>> if (p->seen) {
>> pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
>> sinfo->index);
>> @@ -304,7 +299,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
>> ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> return ret;
>> - pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
>> + pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
>> + n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>> }
>>
>> for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>> index ac72348c186a..96151b2b91a2 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>> @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
>> public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
>> kfree(cert->issuer);
>> kfree(cert->subject);
>> - kfree(cert->fingerprint);
>> + kfree(cert->id);
>> + kfree(cert->skid);
>> kfree(cert->authority);
>> kfree(cert->sig.digest);
>> mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
>> @@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
>> {
>> struct x509_certificate *cert;
>> struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>> long ret;
>>
>> ret = -ENOMEM;
>> @@ -89,6 +91,17 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
>> if (ret < 0)
>> goto error_decode;
>>
>> + /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
>> + cert->raw_serial_size,
>> + cert->raw_issuer,
>> + cert->raw_issuer_size);
>> + if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
>> + ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
>> + goto error_decode;
>> + }
>> + cert->id = kid;
>> +
>> kfree(ctx);
>> return cert;
>>
>> @@ -407,36 +420,34 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>> const void *value, size_t vlen)
>> {
>> struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>> const unsigned char *v = value;
>> - char *f;
>> int i;
>>
>> pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
>>
>> if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
>> /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
>> - if (vlen < 3)
>> + if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
>> return -EBADMSG;
>> if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
>> return -EBADMSG;
>> v += 2;
>> vlen -= 2;
>>
>> - f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> - if (!f)
>> - return -ENOMEM;
>> - for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
>> - sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
>> - pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f);
>> - ctx->cert->fingerprint = f;
>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
>> + ctx->cert->raw_subject,
>> + ctx->cert->raw_subject_size);
>> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
>> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
>> + ctx->cert->skid = kid;
>> + pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
>> - size_t key_len;
>> -
>> /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
>> - if (vlen < 5)
>> + if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
>> return -EBADMSG;
>>
>> /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
>> @@ -454,7 +465,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>> v[3] > vlen - 4)
>> return -EBADMSG;
>>
>> - key_len = v[3];
>> + vlen = v[3];
>> v += 4;
>> } else {
>> /* Long Form length */
>> @@ -476,17 +487,17 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>> v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
>> return -EBADMSG;
>>
>> - key_len = v[sub + 1];
>> + vlen = v[sub + 1];
>> v += (sub + 2);
>> }
>>
>> - f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> - if (!f)
>> - return -ENOMEM;
>> - for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
>> - sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
>> - pr_debug("authority %s\n", f);
>> - ctx->cert->authority = f;
>> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
>> + ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
>> + ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size);
>> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
>> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
>> + pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
>> + ctx->cert->authority = kid;
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>> index 1b76f207c1f3..0e8d59b010fb 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>> @@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
>> struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
>> char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
>> char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
>> - char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */
>> - char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + serial number */
>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject key identifier */
>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier */
>> struct tm valid_from;
>> struct tm valid_to;
>> const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>> index f3d62307e6ee..c60905c3f4d2 100644
>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
>> #include "x509_parser.h"
>>
>> static bool use_builtin_keys;
>> -static char *ca_keyid;
>> +static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
>>
>> #ifndef MODULE
>> static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
>> @@ -33,10 +33,16 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
>> if (!str) /* default system keyring */
>> return 1;
>>
>> - if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
>> - ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
>> - else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
>> + if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
>> + struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
>> + p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str);
>> + if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
>> + pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
>> + else if (!IS_ERR(p))
>> + ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
>> + } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
>> use_builtin_keys = true;
>> + }
>>
>> return 1;
>> }
>> @@ -46,31 +52,28 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
>> /**
>> * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
>> * @keyring: The keys to search.
>> - * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs.
>> - * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string.
>> + * @kid: The key ID.
>> *
>> * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might,
>> * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
>> * certificate that needs to be verified.
>> */
>> struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
>> - const char *subject,
>> - const char *key_id)
>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid)
>> {
>> key_ref_t key;
>> - size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id);
>> - char *id;
>> + char *id, *p;
>>
>> - /* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */
>> - id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
>> + p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> if (!id)
>> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>>
>> - memcpy(id, subject, subject_len);
>> - id[subject_len + 0] = ':';
>> - id[subject_len + 1] = ' ';
>> - memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len);
>> - id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0;
>> + *p++ = 'i';
>> + *p++ = 'd';
>> + *p++ = ':';
>> + p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
>> + *p = 0;
>>
>> pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
>>
>> @@ -195,11 +198,10 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
>> if (!trust_keyring)
>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>
>> - if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
>> + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
>> return -EPERM;
>>
>> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
>> - cert->issuer, cert->authority);
>> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority);
>> if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
>> if (!use_builtin_keys
>> || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
>> @@ -214,9 +216,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
>> */
>> static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>> {
>> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
>> struct x509_certificate *cert;
>> + const char *q;
>> size_t srlen, sulen;
>> - char *desc = NULL;
>> + char *desc = NULL, *p;
>> int ret;
>>
>> cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
>> @@ -249,19 +253,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>> pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
>> hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
>>
>> - if (!cert->fingerprint) {
>> - pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
>> - cert->subject);
>> - ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
>> - goto error_free_cert;
>> - }
>> -
>> cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
>> cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
>>
>> /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
>> if (!cert->authority ||
>> - strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
>> + asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
>> ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
>> if (ret < 0)
>> goto error_free_cert;
>> @@ -273,31 +270,47 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>
>> /* Propose a description */
>> sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
>> - srlen = strlen(cert->fingerprint);
>> + srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
>> + q = cert->raw_serial;
>> + if (srlen > 1 && *q == 0) {
>> + srlen--;
>> + q++;
>> + }
>> +
>> ret = -ENOMEM;
>> - desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>> if (!desc)
>> goto error_free_cert;
>> - memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
>> - desc[sulen] = ':';
>> - desc[sulen + 1] = ' ';
>> - memcpy(desc + sulen + 2, cert->fingerprint, srlen);
>> - desc[sulen + 2 + srlen] = 0;
>> + p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
>> + p += sulen;
>> + *p++ = ':';
>> + *p++ = ' ';
>> + p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
>> + *p = 0;
>> +
>> + kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!kids)
>> + goto error_free_desc;
>> + kids->id[0] = cert->id;
>> + kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
>>
>> /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
>> __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
>> prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
>> - prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
>> + prep->type_data[1] = kids;
>> prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
>> prep->description = desc;
>> prep->quotalen = 100;
>>
>> /* We've finished with the certificate */
>> cert->pub = NULL;
>> - cert->fingerprint = NULL;
>> + cert->id = NULL;
>> + cert->skid = NULL;
>> desc = NULL;
>> ret = 0;
>>
>> +error_free_desc:
>> + kfree(desc);
>> error_free_cert:
>> x509_free_certificate(cert);
>> return ret;
>> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
>> index 0d164c6af539..fa73a6fd536c 100644
>> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
>> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
>> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>> #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
>>
>> #include <linux/mpi.h>
>> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
>> #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
>>
>> enum pkey_algo {
>> @@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ struct key;
>> extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
>> const struct public_key_signature *sig);
>>
>> +struct asymmetric_key_id;
>> extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
>> - const char *issuer,
>> - const char *key_id);
>> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid);
>>
>> #endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
>>
>> --
>> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
>> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>>
> --
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