Re: [PATCH 08/13] KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys

From: Mimi Zohar
Date: Thu Oct 02 2014 - 14:39:08 EST

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In reply to: Dmitry Kasatkin: "Re: [PATCH 08/13] KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys"
Next in thread: David Howells: "Re: [PATCH 08/13] KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys"
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On Thu, 2014-10-02 at 19:04 +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> On 02/10/14 18:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
> > Hi David,
> >
> > I just took latest #next branch from James's security tree which
> > includes latest KEYs patches and noticed following:
> >
> > [ 9.812332] Request for unknown module key 'Magrathea: Glacier
> > signing key: 926305d6dda66f47139eb4e3cb25a6adef527f08' err -11
> >
> > Also I noticed that output of 'keyctl show' and 'cat /proc/keys' output
> > also has changed in respect of certificate ids..
> >
> > Those ids does not look any close to my kernel X509 X509v3 Subject Key
> > Identifier, which is:
> > 92:63:05:D6:DD:A6:6F:47:13:9E:B4:E3:CB:25:A6:AD:EF:52:7F:08
> >
> > proc/keys shows
> >
> > symmetri Magrathea: Glacier signing key: d9e2e4c6951f1e83: X509.RSA
> > 6865612e68326732 []
> >
> > Very different ids..
> >
> > How could I match certificate now?
> > Module verification code cannot find needed key..
> >
> > - Dmitry
>
>
> Hehe. Also now I get kernel Oops in asymmetric_key_id_same...

Confirmed

Mimi

> -------------------------
> [ 132.816522] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
> ffffffffffffffea
> [ 132.819902] IP: [<ffffffff812bfc20>] asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
> [ 132.820302] PGD 1a12067 PUD 1a14067 PMD 0
> [ 132.820302] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [ 132.820302] Modules linked in: bridge(E) stp(E) llc(E) evdev(E)
> serio_raw(E) i2c_piix4(E) button(E) fuse(E)
> [ 132.820302] CPU: 0 PID: 2993 Comm: cat Tainted: G E
> 3.16.0-kds+ #2847
> [ 132.820302] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> [ 132.820302] task: ffff88004249a430 ti: ffff880056640000 task.ti:
> ffff880056640000
> [ 132.820302] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812bfc20>] [<ffffffff812bfc20>]
> asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
> [ 132.820302] RSP: 0018:ffff880056643930 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [ 132.820302] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffffffffea RCX:
> ffff880056643ae0
> [ 132.820302] RDX: 000000000000005e RSI: ffffffffffffffea RDI:
> ffff88005bac9300
> [ 132.820302] RBP: ffff880056643948 R08: 0000000000000003 R09:
> 00000007504aa01a
> [ 132.820302] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
> ffff88005d68ca40
> [ 132.820302] R13: 0000000000000101 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
> ffff88005bac5280
> [ 132.820302] FS: 00007f67a153c740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000)
> knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 132.820302] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
> [ 132.820302] CR2: ffffffffffffffea CR3: 000000002e663000 CR4:
> 00000000000006f0
> [ 132.820302] Stack:
> [ 132.820302] ffffffff812bfc66 ffff880056643ae0 ffff88005bac5280
> ffff880056643958
> [ 132.820302] ffffffff812bfc9d ffff880056643980 ffffffff812971d9
> ffff88005ce930c1
> [ 132.820302] ffff88005ce930c0 0000000000000000 ffff8800566439c8
> ffffffff812fb753
> [ 132.820302] Call Trace:
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc66>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x24/0x42
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc9d>] asymmetric_key_cmp+0x19/0x1b
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812971d9>] keyring_search_iterator+0x74/0xd7
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812fb753>] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x67/0xd2
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812fbaa1>] assoc_array_iterate+0x19/0x1e
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297332>] search_nested_keyrings+0xf6/0x2b6
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810728da>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x91/0xa2
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810860d2>] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x6e
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff810a137d>] ? current_kernel_time+0x77/0xb8
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297871>] keyring_search_aux+0xe1/0x14c
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812977fc>] ? keyring_search_aux+0x6c/0x14c
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff8129796b>] keyring_search+0x8f/0xb6
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812bfc84>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x42/0x42
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ab9e3>] asymmetric_verify+0xa4/0x214
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ab90e>] integrity_digsig_verify+0xb1/0xe2
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812abe41>] ? evm_verifyxattr+0x6a/0x7a
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812b0390>] ima_appraise_measurement+0x160/0x370
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff81161db2>] ? d_absolute_path+0x5b/0x7a
> [ 132.820302] [<ffffffff812ada30>] process_measurement+0x322/0x404
>
>
> > On 08/09/14 18:38, David Howells wrote:
> >> Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification
> >> when searching for asymmetric keys. The following changes are made:
> >>
> >> (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following
> >> key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message:
> >>
> >> id: serial number + issuer
> >> skid: subjKeyId + subject
> >> authority: authKeyId + issuer
> >>
> >> (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an
> >> asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present).
> >>
> >> (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches:
> >>
> >> (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:". The
> >> prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to
> >> search for. The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs
> >> recorded on the key.
> >>
> >> (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:". This will
> >> look for an exact match on the key description.
> >>
> >> (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID. This is then converted
> >> into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing
> >> will turn it back into a binary ID.
> >>
> >> (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks
> >> up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate
> >> signature.
> >>
> >> (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a
> >> key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information
> >> block signature.
> >>
> >> Additional changes:
> >>
> >> (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the
> >> cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG.
> >>
> >> (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone. This was primarily intended to convey PGP
> >> public key fingerprints. If PGP is supported in future, this should
> >> generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint.
> >>
> >> (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and
> >> used to match the authority key ID. Possibly this should only match the
> >> actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
> >> ---
> >>
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 4 -
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 133 ++++++++++++-----------------
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 38 ++++++--
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 5 -
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 6 -
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 44 ++++------
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 55 +++++++-----
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 5 +
> >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 89 +++++++++++--------
> >> include/crypto/public_key.h | 5 +
> >> 10 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
> >> index 917be6b985e7..fd21ac28e0a0 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
> >> @@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
> >> * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
> >> */
> >>
> >> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
> >> extern bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,
> >> const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id);
> >>
> >> extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
> >>
> >> -static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
> >> +static inline
> >> +const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
> >> {
> >> return key->type_data.p[1];
> >> }
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> >> index 3bc71b4e1eed..6f16f647d21b 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
> >> @@ -105,76 +105,15 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
> >> }
> >>
> >> /*
> >> - * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
> >> - * @id: key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
> >> - */
> >> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
> >> -{
> >> - size_t idlen, kidlen;
> >> -
> >> - if (!kid || !id)
> >> - return 0;
> >> -
> >> - /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
> >> - if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
> >> - id += 3;
> >> -
> >> - /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
> >> - idlen = strlen(id);
> >> - kidlen = strlen(kid);
> >> - if (idlen > kidlen)
> >> - return 0;
> >> -
> >> - kid += kidlen - idlen;
> >> - if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
> >> - return 0;
> >> -
> >> - return 1;
> >> -}
> >> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
> >> -
> >> -/*
> >> - * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
> >> - * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow:
> >> - *
> >> - * "<desc>" - request a key by description
> >> - * "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID
> >> - * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype
> >> + * Match asymmetric keys by ID.
> >> */
> >> static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
> >> const struct key_match_data *match_data)
> >> {
> >> - const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
> >> - const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
> >> - const char *spec = description;
> >> - const char *id;
> >> - ptrdiff_t speclen;
> >> -
> >> - if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
> >> - return 0;
> >> -
> >> - /* See if the full key description matches as is */
> >> - if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
> >> - return 1;
> >> -
> >> - /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
> >> - * specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
> >> - */
> >> - id = strchr(spec, ':');
> >> - if (!id)
> >> - return 0;
> >> -
> >> - speclen = id - spec;
> >> - id++;
> >> -
> >> - if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
> >> - return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
> >> + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
> >> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
> >>
> >> - if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
> >> - memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
> >> - return 1;
> >> -
> >> - return 0;
> >> + return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id);
> >> }
> >>
> >> /*
> >> @@ -191,8 +130,30 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
> >> */
> >> static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
> >> {
> >> - match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
> >> + const char *spec = match_data->raw_data;
> >> + const char *id;
> >> +
> >> + if (!spec || !*spec)
> >> + return -EINVAL;
> >> + if (spec[0] == 'i' &&
> >> + spec[1] == 'd' &&
> >> + spec[2] == ':') {
> >> + id = spec + 3;
> >> + } else {
> >> + goto default_match;
> >> + }
> >> +
> >> + match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id);
> >> + if (!match_id)
> >> + return -ENOMEM;
> >> +
> >> + match_data->preparsed = match_id;
> >> match_data->cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp;
> >> + match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
> >> + return 0;
> >> +
> >> +default_match:
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >>
> >> @@ -201,6 +162,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
> >> */
> >> static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
> >> {
> >> + kfree(match_data->preparsed);
> >> }
> >>
> >> /*
> >> @@ -209,8 +171,10 @@ static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
> >> static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
> >> {
> >> const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
> >> - const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
> >> - size_t n;
> >> + const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
> >> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> >> + const unsigned char *p;
> >> + int n;
> >>
> >> seq_puts(m, key->description);
> >>
> >> @@ -218,13 +182,16 @@ static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
> >> seq_puts(m, ": ");
> >> subtype->describe(key, m);
> >>
> >> - if (kid) {
> >> + if (kids && kids->id[0]) {
> >> + kid = kids->id[0];
> >> seq_putc(m, ' ');
> >> - n = strlen(kid);
> >> - if (n <= 8)
> >> - seq_puts(m, kid);
> >> - else
> >> - seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8);
> >> + n = kid->len;
> >> + p = kid->data;
> >> + if (n > 8) {
> >> + p += n - 8;
> >> + n = 8;
> >> + }
> >> + seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p);
> >> }
> >>
> >> seq_puts(m, " [");
> >> @@ -275,6 +242,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> >> static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> >> {
> >> struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0];
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1];
> >>
> >> pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
> >>
> >> @@ -282,7 +250,11 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> >> subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
> >> module_put(subtype->owner);
> >> }
> >> - kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
> >> + if (kids) {
> >> + kfree(kids->id[0]);
> >> + kfree(kids->id[1]);
> >> + kfree(kids);
> >> + }
> >> kfree(prep->description);
> >> }
> >>
> >> @@ -292,13 +264,20 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> >> static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
> >> {
> >> struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1];
> >> +
> >> if (subtype) {
> >> subtype->destroy(key->payload.data);
> >> module_put(subtype->owner);
> >> key->type_data.p[0] = NULL;
> >> }
> >> - kfree(key->type_data.p[1]);
> >> - key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
> >> +
> >> + if (kids) {
> >> + kfree(kids->id[0]);
> >> + kfree(kids->id[1]);
> >> + kfree(kids);
> >> + key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
> >> + }
> >> }
> >>
> >> struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> >> index 459d2077c61b..ad6ae9d7c884 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> >> @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
> >> enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
> >> unsigned x509_index;
> >> unsigned sinfo_index;
> >> + const void *raw_serial;
> >> + unsigned raw_serial_size;
> >> + unsigned raw_issuer_size;
> >> + const void *raw_issuer;
> >> };
> >>
> >> /*
> >> @@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
> >> if (sinfo) {
> >> mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
> >> kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
> >> + kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id);
> >> kfree(sinfo);
> >> }
> >> }
> >> @@ -256,10 +261,10 @@ int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> >> if (IS_ERR(x509))
> >> return PTR_ERR(x509);
> >>
> >> - pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
> >> - pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
> >> -
> >> x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
> >> + pr_debug("Got cert %u for %s\n", x509->index, x509->subject);
> >> + pr_debug("- fingerprint %*phN\n", x509->id->len, x509->id->data);
> >> +
> >> *ctx->ppcerts = x509;
> >> ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
> >> return 0;
> >> @@ -348,8 +353,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> >> const void *value, size_t vlen)
> >> {
> >> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
> >> - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
> >> - ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
> >> + ctx->raw_serial = value;
> >> + ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen;
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >>
> >> @@ -361,8 +366,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> >> const void *value, size_t vlen)
> >> {
> >> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
> >> - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
> >> - ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
> >> + ctx->raw_issuer = value;
> >> + ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >>
> >> @@ -395,10 +400,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> >> const void *value, size_t vlen)
> >> {
> >> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
> >> -
> >> - ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
> >> - *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
> >> - ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
> >> + struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> >> +
> >> + /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
> >> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
> >> + ctx->raw_serial_size,
> >> + ctx->raw_issuer,
> >> + ctx->raw_issuer_size);
> >> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
> >> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
> >> +
> >> + sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
> >> + sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
> >> + *ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
> >> + ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
> >> ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
> >> if (!ctx->sinfo)
> >> return -ENOMEM;
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
> >> index d25f4d15370f..91949f92bc72 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
> >> @@ -33,10 +33,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
> >> const void *authattrs;
> >>
> >> /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
> >> - const void *raw_serial;
> >> - unsigned raw_serial_size;
> >> - unsigned raw_issuer_size;
> >> - const void *raw_issuer;
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
> >>
> >> /* Message signature.
> >> *
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
> >> index e666eb011a85..4e8dd7214753 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
> >> @@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> >> /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
> >> * keys.
> >> */
> >> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject,
> >> - x509->fingerprint);
> >> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id);
> >> if (!IS_ERR(key))
> >> /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
> >> * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
> >> @@ -82,8 +81,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> >> return -ENOKEY;
> >> }
> >>
> >> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer,
> >> - last->authority);
> >> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority);
> >> if (IS_ERR(key))
> >> return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
> >> x509 = last;
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> >> index c62cf8006e1f..57e90fa17f2b 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> >> @@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> >> struct x509_certificate *x509;
> >> unsigned certix = 1;
> >>
> >> - kenter("%u,%u,%u",
> >> - sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
> >> + kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
> >>
> >> for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
> >> /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
> >> @@ -140,21 +139,11 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> >> * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's
> >> * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
> >> */
> >> - if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
> >> - memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
> >> - sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
> >> + if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id))
> >> continue;
> >> pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
> >> sinfo->index, certix);
> >>
> >> - if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
> >> - memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
> >> - sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
> >> - pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n",
> >> - sinfo->index);
> >> - continue;
> >> - }
> >> -
> >> if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
> >> pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
> >> sinfo->index);
> >> @@ -164,8 +153,10 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> >> sinfo->signer = x509;
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >> +
> >> pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
> >> - sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
> >> + sinfo->index,
> >> + sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data);
> >> return -ENOKEY;
> >> }
> >>
> >> @@ -184,7 +175,9 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> >> p->seen = false;
> >>
> >> for (;;) {
> >> - pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
> >> + pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
> >> + x509->subject,
> >> + x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
> >> x509->seen = true;
> >> ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
> >> if (ret < 0)
> >> @@ -192,7 +185,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> >>
> >> pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
> >> if (x509->authority)
> >> - pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
> >> + pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
> >> + x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
> >>
> >> if (!x509->authority ||
> >> strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
> >> @@ -218,13 +212,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> >> /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
> >> * list to see if the next one is there.
> >> */
> >> - pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
> >> + pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
> >> + x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
> >> for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
> >> - pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
> >> - if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
> >> - strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
> >> - memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
> >> - x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
> >> + if (!p->skid)
> >> + continue;
> >> + pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
> >> + p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
> >> + if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
> >> goto found_issuer;
> >> }
> >>
> >> @@ -233,7 +228,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> >> return 0;
> >>
> >> found_issuer:
> >> - pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
> >> + pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
> >> if (p->seen) {
> >> pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
> >> sinfo->index);
> >> @@ -304,7 +299,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
> >> ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
> >> if (ret < 0)
> >> return ret;
> >> - pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
> >> + pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
> >> + n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
> >> }
> >>
> >> for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> >> index ac72348c186a..96151b2b91a2 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> >> @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
> >> public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
> >> kfree(cert->issuer);
> >> kfree(cert->subject);
> >> - kfree(cert->fingerprint);
> >> + kfree(cert->id);
> >> + kfree(cert->skid);
> >> kfree(cert->authority);
> >> kfree(cert->sig.digest);
> >> mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
> >> @@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
> >> {
> >> struct x509_certificate *cert;
> >> struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> >> long ret;
> >>
> >> ret = -ENOMEM;
> >> @@ -89,6 +91,17 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
> >> if (ret < 0)
> >> goto error_decode;
> >>
> >> + /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
> >> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
> >> + cert->raw_serial_size,
> >> + cert->raw_issuer,
> >> + cert->raw_issuer_size);
> >> + if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
> >> + ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
> >> + goto error_decode;
> >> + }
> >> + cert->id = kid;
> >> +
> >> kfree(ctx);
> >> return cert;
> >>
> >> @@ -407,36 +420,34 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> >> const void *value, size_t vlen)
> >> {
> >> struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> >> const unsigned char *v = value;
> >> - char *f;
> >> int i;
> >>
> >> pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> >>
> >> if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
> >> /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
> >> - if (vlen < 3)
> >> + if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
> >> return -EBADMSG;
> >> if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
> >> return -EBADMSG;
> >> v += 2;
> >> vlen -= 2;
> >>
> >> - f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> - if (!f)
> >> - return -ENOMEM;
> >> - for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
> >> - sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
> >> - pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f);
> >> - ctx->cert->fingerprint = f;
> >> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
> >> + ctx->cert->raw_subject,
> >> + ctx->cert->raw_subject_size);
> >> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
> >> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
> >> + ctx->cert->skid = kid;
> >> + pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >>
> >> if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
> >> - size_t key_len;
> >> -
> >> /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
> >> - if (vlen < 5)
> >> + if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
> >> return -EBADMSG;
> >>
> >> /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
> >> @@ -454,7 +465,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> >> v[3] > vlen - 4)
> >> return -EBADMSG;
> >>
> >> - key_len = v[3];
> >> + vlen = v[3];
> >> v += 4;
> >> } else {
> >> /* Long Form length */
> >> @@ -476,17 +487,17 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> >> v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
> >> return -EBADMSG;
> >>
> >> - key_len = v[sub + 1];
> >> + vlen = v[sub + 1];
> >> v += (sub + 2);
> >> }
> >>
> >> - f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> - if (!f)
> >> - return -ENOMEM;
> >> - for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
> >> - sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
> >> - pr_debug("authority %s\n", f);
> >> - ctx->cert->authority = f;
> >> + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
> >> + ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
> >> + ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size);
> >> + if (IS_ERR(kid))
> >> + return PTR_ERR(kid);
> >> + pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
> >> + ctx->cert->authority = kid;
> >> return 0;
> >> }
> >>
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> >> index 1b76f207c1f3..0e8d59b010fb 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> >> @@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
> >> struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
> >> char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
> >> char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
> >> - char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */
> >> - char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + serial number */
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject key identifier */
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier */
> >> struct tm valid_from;
> >> struct tm valid_to;
> >> const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> >> index f3d62307e6ee..c60905c3f4d2 100644
> >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> >> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
> >> #include "x509_parser.h"
> >>
> >> static bool use_builtin_keys;
> >> -static char *ca_keyid;
> >> +static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
> >>
> >> #ifndef MODULE
> >> static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
> >> @@ -33,10 +33,16 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
> >> if (!str) /* default system keyring */
> >> return 1;
> >>
> >> - if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
> >> - ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
> >> - else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
> >> + if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
> >> + p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str);
> >> + if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
> >> + pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
> >> + else if (!IS_ERR(p))
> >> + ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
> >> + } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
> >> use_builtin_keys = true;
> >> + }
> >>
> >> return 1;
> >> }
> >> @@ -46,31 +52,28 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
> >> /**
> >> * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
> >> * @keyring: The keys to search.
> >> - * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs.
> >> - * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string.
> >> + * @kid: The key ID.
> >> *
> >> * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might,
> >> * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
> >> * certificate that needs to be verified.
> >> */
> >> struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
> >> - const char *subject,
> >> - const char *key_id)
> >> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid)
> >> {
> >> key_ref_t key;
> >> - size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id);
> >> - char *id;
> >> + char *id, *p;
> >>
> >> - /* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */
> >> - id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> + /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
> >> + p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> if (!id)
> >> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> >>
> >> - memcpy(id, subject, subject_len);
> >> - id[subject_len + 0] = ':';
> >> - id[subject_len + 1] = ' ';
> >> - memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len);
> >> - id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0;
> >> + *p++ = 'i';
> >> + *p++ = 'd';
> >> + *p++ = ':';
> >> + p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
> >> + *p = 0;
> >>
> >> pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
> >>
> >> @@ -195,11 +198,10 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
> >> if (!trust_keyring)
> >> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >>
> >> - if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
> >> + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
> >> return -EPERM;
> >>
> >> - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
> >> - cert->issuer, cert->authority);
> >> + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority);
> >> if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
> >> if (!use_builtin_keys
> >> || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
> >> @@ -214,9 +216,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
> >> */
> >> static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> >> {
> >> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
> >> struct x509_certificate *cert;
> >> + const char *q;
> >> size_t srlen, sulen;
> >> - char *desc = NULL;
> >> + char *desc = NULL, *p;
> >> int ret;
> >>
> >> cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
> >> @@ -249,19 +253,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> >> pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
> >> hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
> >>
> >> - if (!cert->fingerprint) {
> >> - pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
> >> - cert->subject);
> >> - ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
> >> - goto error_free_cert;
> >> - }
> >> -
> >> cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
> >> cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
> >>
> >> /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
> >> if (!cert->authority ||
> >> - strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
> >> + asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
> >> ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
> >> if (ret < 0)
> >> goto error_free_cert;
> >> @@ -273,31 +270,47 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> >>
> >> /* Propose a description */
> >> sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
> >> - srlen = strlen(cert->fingerprint);
> >> + srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
> >> + q = cert->raw_serial;
> >> + if (srlen > 1 && *q == 0) {
> >> + srlen--;
> >> + q++;
> >> + }
> >> +
> >> ret = -ENOMEM;
> >> - desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> + desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> >> if (!desc)
> >> goto error_free_cert;
> >> - memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
> >> - desc[sulen] = ':';
> >> - desc[sulen + 1] = ' ';
> >> - memcpy(desc + sulen + 2, cert->fingerprint, srlen);
> >> - desc[sulen + 2 + srlen] = 0;
> >> + p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
> >> + p += sulen;
> >> + *p++ = ':';
> >> + *p++ = ' ';
> >> + p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
> >> + *p = 0;
> >> +
> >> + kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
> >> + if (!kids)
> >> + goto error_free_desc;
> >> + kids->id[0] = cert->id;
> >> + kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
> >>
> >> /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
> >> __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
> >> prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
> >> - prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
> >> + prep->type_data[1] = kids;
> >> prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
> >> prep->description = desc;
> >> prep->quotalen = 100;
> >>
> >> /* We've finished with the certificate */
> >> cert->pub = NULL;
> >> - cert->fingerprint = NULL;
> >> + cert->id = NULL;
> >> + cert->skid = NULL;
> >> desc = NULL;
> >> ret = 0;
> >>
> >> +error_free_desc:
> >> + kfree(desc);
> >> error_free_cert:
> >> x509_free_certificate(cert);
> >> return ret;
> >> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> >> index 0d164c6af539..fa73a6fd536c 100644
> >> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> >> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> >> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
> >> #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
> >>
> >> #include <linux/mpi.h>
> >> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
> >> #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
> >>
> >> enum pkey_algo {
> >> @@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ struct key;
> >> extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
> >> const struct public_key_signature *sig);
> >>
> >> +struct asymmetric_key_id;
> >> extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
> >> - const char *issuer,
> >> - const char *key_id);
> >> + const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid);
> >>
> >> #endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
> >>
> >> --
> >> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> >> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> >>
> > --
> > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> > the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> >
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
>

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