Re: [fuse-devel] [PATCH v4 4/5] fuse: Support privileged xattrs only with a mount option

[Eric W. Biederman]

Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

> On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 2:13 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>
>>> On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 01:01:02PM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>> Michael j Theall <mtheall@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>>>>
>>>> > Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote on 10/14/2014 09:25:55 AM:
>>>> >
>>>> >> From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> >> To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>> >> Cc: fuse-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Serge H. Hallyn"
>>>> >> <serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxx>, linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Seth
>>>> >> Forshee <seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Eric W. Biederman"
>>>> >> <ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, linux-fsdevel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>> >> Date: 10/14/2014 09:27 AM
>>>> >> Subject: [fuse-devel] [PATCH v4 4/5] fuse: Support privileged xattrs
>>>> >> only with a mount option
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Allowing unprivileged users to provide arbitrary xattrs via fuse
>>>> >> mounts bypasses the normal restrictions on setting xattrs. Such
>>>> >> mounts should be restricted to reading and writing xattrs in the
>>>> >> user.* namespace.
>>>> >>
>>>> >
>>>> > Can you explain how the normal restrictions on setting xattrs are
>>>> > bypassed?
>>>>
>>>> If the fuse server is not run by root.  Which is a large part of the
>>>> point of fuse.
>>>
>>> So the server could for example return trusted.* xattrs which were not
>>> set by a privileged user.
>>>
>>>> > My filesystem still needs security.* and system.*, and it looks like
>>>> > xattr_permission already prevents non-privileged users from accessing
>>>> > trusted.*
>>>>
>>>> If the filesystem is mounted with nosuid (typical of a non-privileged
>>>> mount of fuse) then the security.* attributes are ignored.
>>>
>>> That I wasn't aware of. In fact I still haven't found where this
>>> restriction is implemented.
>>
>> My memory may be have been incomplete.  What I was thinking of is
>> security/commoncap.c the MNT_NOSUID check in get_file_caps.
>>
>> Upon inspection that appears limited to file capabilities, and while
>> there are a few other MNT_NOSUID checks under security the feel far from
>> complete.
>>
>> Sigh.
>>
>> This deserves a hard look because if MNT_NOSUID is not sufficient than
>> it may be possible for me to insert a usb stick with an extN filesystem
>> with the right labels having it auto-mounted nosuid and subvert the
>> security of something like selinux.
>
> It's this code in selinux/hooks.c:
>
>     if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
>         (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
>         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
>
>
> One might argue that this should actually generate -EPERM instead of
> ignoring the label, but it should be safe against untrusted media.

Fair enough.  Smack does not replicate any form of that check so smack
appears vulnerable to untrusted media.

I don't think we have any other security modules beyond smack and
selinux that use labels.

>>> Nonetheless, a userns mount could be done without nosuid (though that
>>> mount will also be unaccessible outside of that namespace).
>>>
>>>> >> It's difficult though to tell whether a mount is being performed
>>>> >> on behalf of an unprivileged user since fuse mounts are ususally
>>>> >> done via a suid root helper. Thus a new mount option,
>>>> >> privileged_xattrs, is added to indicated that xattrs from other
>>>> >> namespaces are allowed. This option can only be supplied by
>>>> >> system-wide root; supplying the option as an unprivileged user
>>>> >> will cause the mount to fail.
>>>> >
>>>> > I can't say I'm convinced that this is the right direction to head.
>>>>
>>>> With respect to defaults we could keep the current default if you
>>>> have the global CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege when the mount takes place
>>>> and then avoid breaking anything.
>>>
>>> Except that unprivileged mounts are normally done by a suid root helper,
>>> which is why I've required both global CAP_SYS_ADMIN and a mount option
>>> to get the current default behavior.
>>
>> If nosuid is sufficient that may break existing setups for no good
>> reason.
>>
>> Shrug.  I won't have much time for a bit but I figured I would highlight
>> the potential security hole in existing setups.  So someone with time
>> this week can look at that.
>
> I think I have a better solution.  I'll send it out.
>
> Serge had also mentioned adding some kind of hook to help LSMs handle
> user namespaces more intelligently.

Eric

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