[PATCHv7 1/3] syscalls,x86: implement execveat() system call

From: David Drysdale
Date: Fri Nov 07 2014 - 12:06:34 EST

Add a new execveat(2) system call. execveat() is to execve() as
openat() is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a
directory, and resolves the filename relative to that.

In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers. This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in
other UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening
"/proc/self/fd/<fd>" (and so relies on /proc being mounted).

The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/<fd>"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found. This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also,
script execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file
will not be accessible after exec).

Only x86-64, i386 and x32 ABIs are supported in this patch.

Based on patches by Meredydd Luff <meredydd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/ia32/audit.c | 1 +
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 28 ++++++++++
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 +
arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 2 +
arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c | 1 +
fs/binfmt_em86.c | 4 ++
fs/binfmt_misc.c | 4 ++
fs/binfmt_script.c | 10 ++++
fs/exec.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/namei.c | 2 +-
include/linux/binfmts.h | 4 ++
include/linux/compat.h | 3 ++
include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
include/linux/sched.h | 4 ++
include/linux/syscalls.h | 4 ++
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +-
kernel/sys_ni.c | 3 ++
lib/audit.c | 3 ++
20 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/audit.c b/arch/x86/ia32/audit.c
index 5d7b381da692..2eccc8932ae6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/audit.c
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/audit.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int ia32_classify_syscall(unsigned syscall)
case __NR_socketcall:
return 4;
case __NR_execve:
+ case __NR_execveat:
return 5;
default:
return 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
index 4299eb05023c..2516c09743e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
@@ -464,6 +464,7 @@ GLOBAL(\label)
PTREGSCALL stub32_rt_sigreturn, sys32_rt_sigreturn
PTREGSCALL stub32_sigreturn, sys32_sigreturn
PTREGSCALL stub32_execve, compat_sys_execve
+ PTREGSCALL stub32_execveat, compat_sys_execveat
PTREGSCALL stub32_fork, sys_fork
PTREGSCALL stub32_vfork, sys_vfork

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c
index 06d3e5a14d9d..f3672508b249 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/audit_64.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall)
case __NR_openat:
return 3;
case __NR_execve:
+ case __NR_execveat:
return 5;
default:
return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
index 2fac1343a90b..00c4526e6ffe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -665,6 +665,20 @@ ENTRY(stub_execve)
CFI_ENDPROC
END(stub_execve)

+ENTRY(stub_execveat)
+ CFI_STARTPROC
+ addq $8, %rsp
+ PARTIAL_FRAME 0
+ SAVE_REST
+ FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
+ call sys_execveat
+ RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
+ movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
+ RESTORE_REST
+ jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
+ CFI_ENDPROC
+END(stub_execveat)
+
/*
* sigreturn is special because it needs to restore all registers on return.
* This cannot be done with SYSRET, so use the IRET return path instead.
@@ -710,6 +724,20 @@ ENTRY(stub_x32_execve)
CFI_ENDPROC
END(stub_x32_execve)

+ENTRY(stub_x32_execveat)
+ CFI_STARTPROC
+ addq $8, %rsp
+ PARTIAL_FRAME 0
+ SAVE_REST
+ FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
+ call compat_sys_execveat
+ RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %r11
+ movq %rax,RAX(%rsp)
+ RESTORE_REST
+ jmp int_ret_from_sys_call
+ CFI_ENDPROC
+END(stub_x32_execveat)
+
#endif

/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index 028b78168d85..2633e3195455 100644
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -363,3 +363,4 @@
354 i386 seccomp sys_seccomp
355 i386 getrandom sys_getrandom
356 i386 memfd_create sys_memfd_create
+357 i386 execveat sys_execveat stub32_execveat
diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index 35dd922727b9..1af5badd159c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@
318 common getrandom sys_getrandom
319 common memfd_create sys_memfd_create
320 common kexec_file_load sys_kexec_file_load
+321 64 execveat stub_execveat

#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
@@ -365,3 +366,4 @@
542 x32 getsockopt compat_sys_getsockopt
543 x32 io_setup compat_sys_io_setup
544 x32 io_submit compat_sys_io_submit
+545 x32 execveat stub_x32_execveat
diff --git a/arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c b/arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c
index f2f0723070ca..20c3649d0691 100644
--- a/arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/um/sys_call_table_64.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#define stub_fork sys_fork
#define stub_vfork sys_vfork
#define stub_execve sys_execve
+#define stub_execveat sys_execveat
#define stub_rt_sigreturn sys_rt_sigreturn

#define __SYSCALL_COMMON(nr, sym, compat) __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym, compat)
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_em86.c b/fs/binfmt_em86.c
index f37b08cea1f7..490538536cb4 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_em86.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_em86.c
@@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ static int load_em86(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
return -ENOEXEC;
}

+ /* Need to be able to load the file after exec */
+ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
allow_write_access(bprm->file);
fput(bprm->file);
bprm->file = NULL;
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
index b60500300dd7..e659f5562356 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
@@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (!fmt)
goto _ret;

+ /* Need to be able to load the file after exec */
+ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
if (!(fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0)) {
retval = remove_arg_zero(bprm);
if (retval)
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_script.c b/fs/binfmt_script.c
index 5027a3e14922..afdf4e3cafc2 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_script.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_script.c
@@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ static int load_script(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

if ((bprm->buf[0] != '#') || (bprm->buf[1] != '!'))
return -ENOEXEC;
+
+ /*
+ * If the script filename will be inaccessible after exec, typically
+ * because it is a "/dev/fd/<fd>/.." path against an O_CLOEXEC fd, give
+ * up now (on the assumption that the interpreter will want to load
+ * this file).
+ */
+ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
/*
* This section does the #! interpretation.
* Sorta complicated, but hopefully it will work. -TYT
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index a2b42a98c743..500363723b57 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -747,18 +747,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(setup_arg_pages);

#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */

-static struct file *do_open_exec(struct filename *name)
+static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
{
struct file *file;
int err;
- static const struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
+ struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
.open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
.acc_mode = MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN,
.intent = LOOKUP_OPEN,
.lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW,
};

- file = do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, name, &open_exec_flags);
+ if ((flags & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ if (flags & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+ open_exec_flags.lookup_flags &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ if (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
+ open_exec_flags.lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+
+ file = do_filp_open(fd, name, &open_exec_flags);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out;

@@ -769,12 +776,13 @@ static struct file *do_open_exec(struct filename *name)
if (file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
goto exit;

- fsnotify_open(file);
-
err = deny_write_access(file);
if (err)
goto exit;

+ if (name->name[0] != '\0')
+ fsnotify_open(file);
+
out:
return file;

@@ -786,7 +794,7 @@ exit:
struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
{
struct filename tmp = { .name = name };
- return do_open_exec(&tmp);
+ return do_open_execat(AT_FDCWD, &tmp, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(open_exec);

@@ -1422,10 +1430,12 @@ static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
/*
* sys_execve() executes a new program.
*/
-static int do_execve_common(struct filename *filename,
- struct user_arg_ptr argv,
- struct user_arg_ptr envp)
+static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename,
+ struct user_arg_ptr argv,
+ struct user_arg_ptr envp,
+ int flags)
{
+ char *pathbuf = NULL;
struct linux_binprm *bprm;
struct file *file;
struct files_struct *displaced;
@@ -1466,7 +1476,7 @@ static int do_execve_common(struct filename *filename,
check_unsafe_exec(bprm);
current->in_execve = 1;

- file = do_open_exec(filename);
+ file = do_open_execat(fd, filename, flags);
retval = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto out_unmark;
@@ -1474,7 +1484,26 @@ static int do_execve_common(struct filename *filename,
sched_exec();

bprm->file = file;
- bprm->filename = bprm->interp = filename->name;
+ if (fd == AT_FDCWD || filename->name[0] == '/') {
+ bprm->filename = filename->name;
+ } else {
+ if (filename->name[0] == '\0')
+ pathbuf = kasprintf(GFP_TEMPORARY, "/dev/fd/%d", fd);
+ else
+ pathbuf = kasprintf(GFP_TEMPORARY, "/dev/fd/%d/%s",
+ fd, filename->name);
+ if (!pathbuf) {
+ retval = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_unmark;
+ }
+ /* Record that a name derived from an O_CLOEXEC fd will be
+ * inaccessible after exec. Relies on having exclusive access to
+ * current->files (due to unshare_files above). */
+ if (close_on_exec(fd, current->files->fdt))
+ bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE;
+ bprm->filename = pathbuf;
+ }
+ bprm->interp = bprm->filename;

retval = bprm_mm_init(bprm);
if (retval)
@@ -1532,6 +1561,7 @@ out_unmark:

out_free:
free_bprm(bprm);
+ kfree(pathbuf);

out_files:
if (displaced)
@@ -1547,7 +1577,18 @@ int do_execve(struct filename *filename,
{
struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .ptr.native = __argv };
struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .ptr.native = __envp };
- return do_execve_common(filename, argv, envp);
+ return do_execveat_common(AT_FDCWD, filename, argv, envp, 0);
+}
+
+int do_execveat(int fd, struct filename *filename,
+ const char __user *const __user *__argv,
+ const char __user *const __user *__envp,
+ int flags)
+{
+ struct user_arg_ptr argv = { .ptr.native = __argv };
+ struct user_arg_ptr envp = { .ptr.native = __envp };
+
+ return do_execveat_common(fd, filename, argv, envp, flags);
}

#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
@@ -1563,7 +1604,23 @@ static int compat_do_execve(struct filename *filename,
.is_compat = true,
.ptr.compat = __envp,
};
- return do_execve_common(filename, argv, envp);
+ return do_execveat_common(AT_FDCWD, filename, argv, envp, 0);
+}
+
+static int compat_do_execveat(int fd, struct filename *filename,
+ const compat_uptr_t __user *__argv,
+ const compat_uptr_t __user *__envp,
+ int flags)
+{
+ struct user_arg_ptr argv = {
+ .is_compat = true,
+ .ptr.compat = __argv,
+ };
+ struct user_arg_ptr envp = {
+ .is_compat = true,
+ .ptr.compat = __envp,
+ };
+ return do_execveat_common(fd, filename, argv, envp, flags);
}
#endif

@@ -1603,6 +1660,20 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve,
{
return do_execve(getname(filename), argv, envp);
}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat,
+ int, fd, const char __user *, filename,
+ const char __user *const __user *, argv,
+ const char __user *const __user *, envp,
+ int, flags)
+{
+ int lookup_flags = (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH) ? LOOKUP_EMPTY : 0;
+
+ return do_execveat(fd,
+ getname_flags(filename, lookup_flags, NULL),
+ argv, envp, flags);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve, const char __user *, filename,
const compat_uptr_t __user *, argv,
@@ -1610,4 +1681,17 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(execve, const char __user *, filename,
{
return compat_do_execve(getname(filename), argv, envp);
}
+
+COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(execveat, int, fd,
+ const char __user *, filename,
+ const compat_uptr_t __user *, argv,
+ const compat_uptr_t __user *, envp,
+ int, flags)
+{
+ int lookup_flags = (flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH) ? LOOKUP_EMPTY : 0;
+
+ return compat_do_execveat(fd,
+ getname_flags(filename, lookup_flags, NULL),
+ argv, envp, flags);
+}
#endif
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index a7b05bf82d31..553c84d3e0cc 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ void final_putname(struct filename *name)

#define EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX (PATH_MAX - sizeof(struct filename))

-static struct filename *
+struct filename *
getname_flags(const char __user *filename, int flags, int *empty)
{
struct filename *result, *err;
diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h
index 61f29e5ea840..576e4639ca60 100644
--- a/include/linux/binfmts.h
+++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ struct linux_binprm {
#define BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD_BIT 1
#define BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD (1 << BINPRM_FLAGS_EXECFD_BIT)

+/* filename of the binary will be inaccessible after exec */
+#define BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE_BIT 2
+#define BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE (1 << BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE_BIT)
+
/* Function parameter for binfmt->coredump */
struct coredump_params {
const siginfo_t *siginfo;
diff --git a/include/linux/compat.h b/include/linux/compat.h
index e6494261eaff..7450ca2ac1fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/compat.h
+++ b/include/linux/compat.h
@@ -357,6 +357,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_lseek(unsigned int, compat_off_t, unsigned int);

asmlinkage long compat_sys_execve(const char __user *filename, const compat_uptr_t __user *argv,
const compat_uptr_t __user *envp);
+asmlinkage long compat_sys_execveat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
+ const compat_uptr_t __user *argv,
+ const compat_uptr_t __user *envp, int flags);

asmlinkage long compat_sys_select(int n, compat_ulong_t __user *inp,
compat_ulong_t __user *outp, compat_ulong_t __user *exp,
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 94187721ad41..e9818574d738 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2060,6 +2060,7 @@ extern struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *, struct vfsmount *,
extern struct file * dentry_open(const struct path *, int, const struct cred *);
extern int filp_close(struct file *, fl_owner_t id);

+extern struct filename *getname_flags(const char __user *, int, int *);
extern struct filename *getname(const char __user *);
extern struct filename *getname_kernel(const char *);

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index b867a4dab38a..33e056da7d33 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -2430,6 +2430,10 @@ extern void do_group_exit(int);
extern int do_execve(struct filename *,
const char __user * const __user *,
const char __user * const __user *);
+extern int do_execveat(int, struct filename *,
+ const char __user * const __user *,
+ const char __user * const __user *,
+ int);
extern long do_fork(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, int __user *, int __user *);
struct task_struct *fork_idle(int);
extern pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 0f86d85a9ce4..df5422294deb 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -876,4 +876,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
asmlinkage long sys_getrandom(char __user *buf, size_t count,
unsigned int flags);

+asmlinkage long sys_execveat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
+ const char __user *const __user *argv,
+ const char __user *const __user *envp, int flags);
+
#endif
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
index 11d11bc5c78f..feef07d29663 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h
@@ -705,9 +705,11 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_seccomp, sys_seccomp)
__SYSCALL(__NR_getrandom, sys_getrandom)
#define __NR_memfd_create 279
__SYSCALL(__NR_memfd_create, sys_memfd_create)
+#define __NR_execveat 280
+__SC_COMP(__NR_execveat, sys_execveat, compat_sys_execveat)

#undef __NR_syscalls
-#define __NR_syscalls 280
+#define __NR_syscalls 281

/*
* All syscalls below here should go away really,
diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
index 391d4ddb6f4b..efb06058ad3e 100644
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -218,3 +218,6 @@ cond_syscall(sys_kcmp);

/* operate on Secure Computing state */
cond_syscall(sys_seccomp);
+
+/* execveat */
+cond_syscall(sys_execveat);
diff --git a/lib/audit.c b/lib/audit.c
index 1d726a22565b..b8fb5ee81e26 100644
--- a/lib/audit.c
+++ b/lib/audit.c
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall)
case __NR_socketcall:
return 4;
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_execveat
+ case __NR_execveat:
+#endif
case __NR_execve:
return 5;
default:
--
2.1.0.rc2.206.gedb03e5

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