On Tue, Jan 20, 2015 at 10:10 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:That was my first guess when I read the bug report - but it can't be the fix, because security_sem_alloc() is before the ipc_addid(), with or without the patch.
On 01/20/2015 04:18 AM, Ethan Zhao wrote:Seems it wouldn't happen after commit e8577d1f0329d4842e8302e289fb2c22156abef4 ?
sys_semget()We free the security structure here to avoid a memory leak on a
->newary()
->security_sem_alloc()
->sem_alloc_security()
selinux_sem_alloc_security()
->ipc_alloc_security() {
->rc = avc_has_perm()
if (rc) {
ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
return rc;
failed/denied semaphore set creation. In this situation, we return an
error to the caller (ultimately to newary), it does an
ipc_rcu_putref(sma, ipc_rcu_free), and it returns an error to the
caller. Thus, it never calls ipc_addid() and the semaphore set is not
created. So how then can you call semtimedop() on it?
Thanks,
Ethan
So ipc_perms->security was NULL, then semtimedop() was called asThat is not the correct fix; it just hides a bug. If we reach
following:
sys_semtimedop() / semop()
->selinux_sem_semop()
->ipc_has_perm()
->avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
^- NULL pointer dereference happens
The test kernel was running on VMware.
This patch use to fix this serious security issue could be triggered by user space.
This patch was tested with v3.19-rc5.
Signed-off-by: Ethan Zhao <ethan.zhao@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6da7532..bbe76f5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5129,6 +5129,8 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
u32 sid = current_sid();
isec = ipc_perms->security;
+ if (!isec)
+ return -EACCES;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
ipc_has_perm() with a NULL isec, it is a bug in the ipc code.
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