Re: [RFC] Implement ambient capability set.

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> On Wed, Feb 4, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> >> On Wed, Feb 4, 2015 at 1:16 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> > Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> >> >> On Wed, Feb 4, 2015 at 10:49 AM, Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >> >> > +
> >> >> > +               if (!cap_valid(arg2))
> >> >> > +                       return -EINVAL;
> >> >> > +
> >> >> > +               new =prepare_creds();
> >> >> > +               if (arg3 == 0)
> >> >> > +                       cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg2);
> >> >> > +               else
> >> >> > +                       cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg2);
> >> >> > +               return commit_creds(new);
> >> >> > +
> >> >>
> >> >> This let you add capabilities you don't even have to cap_ambient.  I'm
> >> >> fine with that as long as the cap evolution rule changes, as above.
> >> >
> >> > How about if instead we do restrict it to what's in pP?  I don't
> >> > want CAP_SETPCAP to become a cheap way to get all caps back.  With
> >> > or without NNP.
> >>
> >> We'd also have to modify everything that can change pP to change pA as
> >> well if we went this route.  I'd be okay with that, but it would make
> >> the patch much larger, and I'm not entirely sure I see the benefit.
> >> It would keep the number of possible states smaller, which could be
> >> nice.
> >
> > Do you mean if we didn't require NNP?  I'm suggesting that even if
> > we require NNP we should restrict any new bits added to pA to be
> > in pP at the prctl call.  Then whether or not to drop them from
> > pA when they are dropped from pP, I'm not yet certain.
> 
> I mean regardless of whether we require NNP.
> 
> I think that, unless we change the evolution rule, we would need to
> drop from pA when bits are dropped from pP to preserve the idea that
> dropping bits from pP drops them for good (as long as ruid != 0 or
> some securebit is set).

Ok, so iiuc the rules would be:

1. must set nnp and have ns_capable(CAP_SETPCAP) to
call prctl(PR_SET_AMBIENT_WHATEVER)

2. adding bits to pA requires they be in pP at prctl time

3. dropping bits from pP drops them also from pA

4. at exec, fP |= pA;  pA' = pA

Christoph, would these suffice for your use caes?
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/