Re: [RFC] Implement ambient capability set.

[Christoph Lameter]

On Wed, 4 Feb 2015, Andy Lutomirski wrote:

> But someone will want to run *bash* as an untrusted user with, say,
> CAP_NET_BIND permitted and ambient.  Then that user has a non-empty
> ambient set, and they can run a setuid-root program, and who knows
> what will go wrong?  Requiring no_new_privs would prevent this type of
> failure entirely.
>
> If we need to relax that later, it's easy, I think.  The rule's not
> that convoluted, and there's precedent for having new fancy features
> require setting no_new_privs first.

It would make the patch pointless. The case of having to run a setuid root
prpgrams from a shell that has the caps enabled is a routine thing for
testing etc.

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