Re: [PATCH 0/1] futex: check PF_KTHREAD rather than !p->mm to filter out kthreads

[Oleg Nesterov]

Let me first say that I simply do not know if PI+robust futex is actually
supposed (or guaranteed) to work.

Documentation/pi-futex.txt says

	'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal
	properties of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex,
	robust-futex, PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.

And exit_robust_list() checks bit 0 to detect the "PI" case, so I think
this should work.

However, this comment

	/*
	 * This task is holding PI mutexes at exit time => bad.
	 * Kernel cleans up PI-state, but userspace is likely hosed.
	 * (Robust-futex cleanup is separate and might save the day for userspace.)
	 */

above exit_pi_state_list() looks confusing. In fact it looks wrong if
PI+robust should work. Because handle_futex_death() seems to rely on
exit_pi_state_list.

Now, if it should work,

On 02/05, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>
> So as long as we unhash _last_ I can't see this happening, we'll always
> find the task, the robust list walk doesn't care about PI state.

and it simply can't take care of PI state. ->pi_state can be NULL by
the time exit_robust_list() is called.

> But please, if you suspect, share a little more detail on how you see
> this happening, this is not code I've looked at in detail before.

Heh, I am reading it for the first time ;) So I can be easily wrong.

But afaics the race/problem is very simple. Suppose a task T locks a PI+robust
mutex and exits. I this case (I presume) sys_futex(uaddr, FUTEX_LOCK_PI)
from another task X must always succeed sooner or later. But

	- X takes queue_lock() and reads *uaddr == T->pid. Need to setup
	  pi_state and wait. FUTEX_WAITERS is set.

	- T exits and calls handle_futex_death(). This clears FUTEX_TID_MASK
	  and sets FUTEX_OWNER_DIED, without any lock.

	  T->pi_state_list is empty, exit_pi_state_list() does nothing.

	  T goes away or simply sets PF_EXITPIDONE (lets ignore PF_EXITING).

	- X calls attach_to_pi_owner() and futex_find_get_task() returns NULL,
	  or we detect PF_EXITPIDONE, this doesn't really matter.

	  What does matter (unless I missed something) is that -ESRCH is wrong
	  in this case. This mutex was unlocked. It is robust, so we should not
	  miss this unlock.

So I think that in this case we either need to recheck that *uaddr is still the
same (and turn -ESRCH into -EAGAIN otherwise), or change handle_futex_death() to
serialize with X so that it can proceed and attach pi_state.

No?

Oleg.

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