[PATCH 13/16] staging: rtl8723au: suspect code indent for conditional statements

From: M. Vefa Bicakci
Date: Thu Mar 12 2015 - 23:37:05 EST


Correct a number of indentation-with-spaces-and-tabs issues in
rtl8723au's rtw_security.c, according to checkpatch.pl:
WARNING: suspect code indent for conditional statements

Signed-off-by: M. Vefa Bicakci <m.v.b@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/staging/rtl8723au/core/rtw_security.c | 36 +++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723au/core/rtw_security.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723au/core/rtw_security.c
index fd5c4da2c4..dbbe7b348d 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723au/core/rtw_security.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723au/core/rtw_security.c
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ int rtw_tkip_decrypt23a(struct rtw_adapter *padapter,
*((u32 *)crc) = le32_to_cpu(getcrc32(payload, length-4));

if (crc[3] != payload[length - 1] || crc[2] != payload[length - 2] || crc[1] != payload[length - 3] || crc[0] != payload[length - 4]) {
- RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_, ("rtw_wep_decrypt23a:icv error crc[3](%x)!= payload[length-1](%x) || crc[2](%x)!= payload[length-2](%x) || crc[1](%x)!= payload[length-3](%x) || crc[0](%x)!= payload[length-4](%x)\n",
+ RT_TRACE(_module_rtl871x_security_c_, _drv_err_, ("rtw_wep_decrypt23a:icv error crc[3](%x)!= payload[length-1](%x) || crc[2](%x)!= payload[length-2](%x) || crc[1](%x)!= payload[length-3](%x) || crc[0](%x)!= payload[length-4](%x)\n",
crc[3], payload[length - 1], crc[2], payload[length - 2], crc[1], payload[length - 3], crc[0], payload[length - 4]));
res = _FAIL;
}
@@ -908,9 +908,9 @@ static void mix_column(u8 *in, u8 *out)

for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
if ((in[i] & 0x80) == 0x80)
- add1b[i] = 0x1b;
+ add1b[i] = 0x1b;
else
- add1b[i] = 0x00;
+ add1b[i] = 0x00;
}

swap_halfs[0] = in[2]; /* Swap halfs */
@@ -965,21 +965,21 @@ static void aes128k128d(u8 *key, u8 *data, u8 *ciphertext)

for (round = 0; round < 11; round++) {
if (round == 0) {
- xor_128(round_key, data, ciphertext);
- next_key(round_key, round);
+ xor_128(round_key, data, ciphertext);
+ next_key(round_key, round);
} else if (round == 10) {
- byte_sub(ciphertext, intermediatea);
- shift_row(intermediatea, intermediateb);
- xor_128(intermediateb, round_key, ciphertext);
+ byte_sub(ciphertext, intermediatea);
+ shift_row(intermediatea, intermediateb);
+ xor_128(intermediateb, round_key, ciphertext);
} else { /* 1 - 9 */
- byte_sub(ciphertext, intermediatea);
- shift_row(intermediatea, intermediateb);
- mix_column(&intermediateb[0], &intermediatea[0]);
- mix_column(&intermediateb[4], &intermediatea[4]);
- mix_column(&intermediateb[8], &intermediatea[8]);
- mix_column(&intermediateb[12], &intermediatea[12]);
- xor_128(intermediatea, round_key, ciphertext);
- next_key(round_key, round);
+ byte_sub(ciphertext, intermediatea);
+ shift_row(intermediatea, intermediateb);
+ mix_column(&intermediateb[0], &intermediatea[0]);
+ mix_column(&intermediateb[4], &intermediatea[4]);
+ mix_column(&intermediateb[8], &intermediatea[8]);
+ mix_column(&intermediateb[12], &intermediatea[12]);
+ xor_128(intermediatea, round_key, ciphertext);
+ next_key(round_key, round);
}
}

@@ -1480,7 +1480,7 @@ static int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint hdrlen, u8 *pframe, uint plen)
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
padded_buffer[j] = 0x00;
for (j = 0; j < payload_remainder; j++)
- padded_buffer[j] = message[payload_index++];
+ padded_buffer[j] = message[payload_index++];
bitwise_xor(aes_out, padded_buffer, chain_buffer);
aes128k128d(key, chain_buffer, aes_out);
}
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ static int aes_decipher(u8 *key, uint hdrlen, u8 *pframe, uint plen)
message, pn_vector, num_blocks+1);

for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
- padded_buffer[j] = 0x00;
+ padded_buffer[j] = 0x00;
for (j = 0; j < payload_remainder; j++)
padded_buffer[j] = message[payload_index + j];
aes128k128d(key, ctr_preload, aes_out);
--
2.1.4

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