Re: [RFC PATCH] crypto: prevent helper ciphers from being allocated by users

[Stephan Mueller]

Am Dienstag, 17. März 2015, 22:23:50 schrieb Herbert Xu:

Hi Herbert,

>On Fri, Mar 13, 2015 at 10:09:21PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>> +struct crypto_tfm *__crypto_alloc_tfm_safe(struct crypto_alg *alg,
>> u32 type, +					   u32 mask)
>> +{
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Prevent all ciphers from being loaded which have a 
cra_priority
>> +	 * of 0. Those cipher implementations are helper ciphers and
>> +	 * are not intended for general consumption.
>> +	 *
>> +	 * The only exceptions are the compression algorithms which
>> +	 * have no priority.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (!alg->cra_priority &&
>> +	    ((alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) !=
>> +	      CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_PCOMPRESS) &&
>> +	    ((alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) !=
>> +	      CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_COMPRESS))
>> +		return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
>
>How about adding a flag to all these internal algorithms and then
>change crypto_alg_mod_lookup to disable that flag by default?

The issue with flags is the following: first we have to think about 
whether we want a black list or white list approach. Your suggestion 
implies a black list. Black lists for ensuring security is not good IMHO 
as it has a tendency to miss cases. This especially applies to this area 
where we have already an indicator for internal ciphers: the prio is so 
low that it will never ever be selected based on the name. Now, adding a 
flag means that we mark such an internal cipher twice.

Therefore, I would not opt for such a flag (at least for a black list) 
and stay with the prio approach.

Ciao
Stephan
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