Re: [RFC] capabilities: Ambient capabilities

[Christoph Lameter]

On Sat, 14 Mar 2015, Andrew G. Morgan wrote:

>
> I thought I did. Please implement a lockable secure bit and I will

Would this suffice? It puts the CAP_SETPCAP limitation back to how it
was in my earlier patch.



Subject: ambient caps: Allow disabling with SETPCAP

Do not allow setting ambient caps if CAP_SETPCAP is not set.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@xxxxxxxxx>

Index: linux/security/commoncap.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/security/commoncap.c
+++ linux/security/commoncap.c
@@ -962,6 +962,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned
 		if (((!cap_valid(arg3)) | arg4 | arg5))
 			return -EINVAL;

+		if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
+			return -EPERM;
+
 		if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_GET) {
 			return !!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_ambient, arg3);
 		} else if (arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
--
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