Re: [RFC PATCH] Security: ignore private inode from security_file_receive
From: Stephen Smalley
Date: Thu Apr 16 2015 - 09:49:44 EST
On 04/16/2015 09:40 AM, Seung-Woo Kim wrote:
> The dma-buf fd from anon_inode can be shared across processes, but
> there is no way to set security permission for the fd. So this
> patch fix just to ignore private inode from security_file_receive.
>
> Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>
> If security like smack is enabled, the dmabuf fd can not be shared between
> processes via unix domain socket. I am not familiar with security, so I am
> not sure that this kind of patch can be acceptable.
>
> Is there other option to share dmabuf fd via socket with security check?
>
> Best Regards,
> - Seung-Woo Kim
>
> ---
> security/security.c | 3 +++
> 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 730ac65..c57354c 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -810,6 +810,9 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
>
> int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
> {
> +
> + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode)))
> + return 0;
> return security_ops->file_receive(file);
> }
SELinux handles this internally; see its inode_has_perm() function.
Doing it here would prevent any security module checking at all, even of
the struct file, which SELinux does presently do (selinux_file_receive
calls file_has_perm which applies the fd use check and then calls
inode_has_perm on the inode). Unless you are saying that the
file->f_security field is also not being set correctly.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/