Re: [PATCH V6 05/10] audit: log creation and deletion of namespace instances
From: Richard Guy Briggs
Date: Thu May 14 2015 - 20:49:33 EST
On 15/05/14, Steve Grubb wrote:
> On Tuesday, May 12, 2015 03:57:59 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > On 15/05/05, Steve Grubb wrote:
> > > I think there needs to be some more discussion around this. It seems like
> > > this is not exactly recording things that are useful for audit.
> > It seems to me that either audit has to assemble that information, or
> > the kernel has to do so. The kernel doesn't know about containers
> > (yet?).
> Auditing is something that has a lot of requirements imposed on it by security
> standards. There was no requirement to have an auid until audit came along and
> said that uid is not good enough to know who is issuing commands because of su
> or sudo. There was no requirement for sessionid until we had to track each
> action back to a login so we could see if the login came from the expected
> What I am saying is we have the same situation. Audit needs to track a
> container and we need an ID. The information that is being logged is not
> useful for auditing. Maybe someone wants that info in syslog, but I doubt it.
> The audit trail's purpose is to allow a security officer to reconstruct the
> events to determine what happened during some security incident.
I agree the information being logged is not yet useful, but it is a
component of what would be. I wasn't ever thinking about syslog... It
is this trail that I was trying to help create.
> What they would want to know is what resources were assigned; if two
> containers shared a resource, what resource and container was it shared with;
> if two containers can communicate, we need to see or control information flow
> when necessary; and we need to see termination and release of resources.
So, namespaces are a big part of this. I understand how they are
spawned and potentially shared. I have a more vague idea about how
cgroups contribute to this concept of a container. So far, I have very
little idea how seccomp contributes, but I assume that it will also need
to be part of this tracking.
> Also, if the host OS cannot make sense of the information being logged because
> the pid maps to another process name, or a uid maps to another user, or a file
> access maps to something not in the host's, then we need the container to do
> its own auditing and resolve these mappings and optionally pass these to an
> aggregation server.
I'm open to both being possible.
> Nothing else makes sense.
> > > On Friday, April 17, 2015 03:35:52 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> > > > Log the creation and deletion of namespace instances in all 6 types of
> > > > namespaces.
> > > >
> > > > Twelve new audit message types have been introduced:
> > > > AUDIT_NS_INIT_MNT 1330 /* Record mount namespace instance
> > > > creation
> > > > */ AUDIT_NS_INIT_UTS 1331 /* Record UTS namespace instance
> > > > creation */ AUDIT_NS_INIT_IPC 1332 /* Record IPC namespace
> > > > instance creation */ AUDIT_NS_INIT_USER 1333 /* Record USER
> > > > namespace instance creation */ AUDIT_NS_INIT_PID 1334 /* Record
> > > > PID namespace instance creation */ AUDIT_NS_INIT_NET 1335 /*
> > > > Record NET namespace instance creation */ AUDIT_NS_DEL_MNT 1336
> > > > /* Record mount namespace instance deletion */ AUDIT_NS_DEL_UTS
> > > > 1337
> > > >
> > > > /* Record UTS namespace instance deletion */ AUDIT_NS_DEL_IPC
> > > >
> > > > 1338 /* Record IPC namespace instance deletion */ AUDIT_NS_DEL_USER
> > > >
> > > > 1339 /* Record USER namespace instance deletion */ AUDIT_NS_DEL_PID
> > > >
> > > > 1340 /* Record PID namespace instance deletion */ AUDIT_NS_DEL_NET
> > > >
> > > > 1341 /* Record NET namespace instance deletion */
> > >
> > > The requirements for auditing of containers should be derived from VPP. In
> > > it, it asks for selectable auditing, selective audit, and selective audit
> > > review. What this means is that we need the container and all its
> > > children to have one identifier that is inserted into all the events that
> > > are associated with the container.
> > Is that requirement for the records that are sent from the kernel, or
> > for the records stored by auditd, or by another facility that delivers
> > those records to a final consumer?
> A little of both. Selective audit means that you can set rules to include or
> exclude an event. This is done in the kernel. Selectable review means that the
> user space tools need to be able to skip past records not of interest to a
> specific line of inquiry. Also, logging everything and letting user space work
> it out later is also not a solution because the needle is harder to find in a
> larger haystack. Or, the logs may rotate and its gone forever because the
> partition is filled.
I agree it needs to be a balance of flexibility and efficiency.
> > > With this, its possible to do a search for all events related to a
> > > container. Its possible to exclude events from a container. Its possible
> > > to not get any events.
> > >
> > > The requirements also call out for the identification of the subject. This
> > > means that the event should be bound to a syscall such as clone, setns, or
> > > unshare.
> > Is it useful to have a reference of the init namespace set from which
> > all others are spawned?
> For things directly observable by the init name space, yes.
Ok, so we'll need to have a way to document that initial state on boot
before any other processes start, preferably in one clear brief record.
> > If it isn't bound, I assume the subject should be added to the message
> > format? I'm thinking of messages without an audit_context such as audit
> > user messages (such as AUDIT_NS_INFO and AUDIT_VIRT_CONTROL).
> Making these events auxiliary records to a syscall is all that is needed. The
> same way that PATH is added to an open event. If someone wants to have
> container/namespace events, they add a rule on clone(2).
This doesn't make sense. The point of this type of record is to have a
way for a userspace container manager (which maybe should have a new CAP
type) to tie the creation of namespaces to a specific container name or
ID. It might even contain cgroup and/or seccomp info.
> > For now, we should not need to log namespaces with AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE
> > or AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE messages since only initial user namespace with
> > initial pid namespace has permission to do so. This will need to be
> > addressed by having non-init config changes be limited to that container
> > or set of namespaces and possibly its children. The other possibility
> > is to add the subject to the stand-alone message.
> > > Also, any user space events originating inside the container needs to have
> > > the container ID added to the user space event - just like auid and
> > > session id.
> > This sounds like every task needs to record a container ID since that
> > information is otherwise unknown by the kernel except by what might be
> > provided by an audit user message such as AUDIT_VIRT_CONTROL or possibly
> > the new AUDIT_NS_INFO request.
> Right. The same as we record auid and ses on every event. We'll need a
> container ID logged with everything. -1 for unset, meaning init namespace.
Ok, that might remove the need for the reply I just wrote above.
> > It could be stored in struct task_struct or in struct audit_context. I
> > don't have a suggestion on how to get that information securely into the
> > kernel.
> That is where I'd suggest. Its for audit subsystem needs.
struct audit_context would be my choice.
> > > Recording each instance of a name space is giving me something that I
> > > cannot use to do queries required by the security target. Given these
> > > events, how do I locate a web server event where it accesses a watched
> > > file? That authentication failed? That an update within the container
> > > failed?
> > >
> > > The requirements are that we have to log the creation, suspension,
> > > migration, and termination of a container. The requirements are not on
> > > the individual name space.
> > Ok. Do we have a robust definition of a container?
> We call the combination of name spaces, cgroups, and seccomp rules a
Can you detail what information is required from each?
> > Where is that definition managed?
> In the thing that invokes a container.
I was looking for a reference to a standards document rather than an
> > If it is a userspace concept, then I think either userspace should be
> > assembling this information, or providing that information to the entity
> > that will be expected to know about and provide it.
> Well, uid is a userspace concept, too. But we record an auid and keep it
> immutable so that we can check enforcement of system security policy which is
> also a user space concept. These things need to be collected to a place that
> can be associated with events as needed. That place is the kernel.
I am fine with putting that in the kernel if that is what makes most
> > > Maybe I'm missing how these events give me that. But I'd like to
> > > hear how I would be able to meet requirements with these 12
> > > events.
> > Adding the infrastructure to give each of those 12 events an audit
> > context to be able to give meaningful subject fields in audit records
> > appears to require adding a struct task_struct argument to calls to
> > copy_mnt_ns(), copy_utsname(), copy_ipcs(), copy_pid_ns(),
> > copy_net_ns(), create_user_ns() unless I use current. I think we must
> > use current since the userns is created before the spawned process is
> > mature or has an audit context in the case of clone.
> I think you are heading down the wrong path.
That's why I started questioning it...
> We can tell from syscall flags what is being done. Try this:
> ## Optional - log container creation
> -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clone -F a0&0x7C020000 -F key=container-create
> -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clone -F a0&0x7C020000 -F key=container-create
> ## Optional - watch for containers that may change their configuration
> -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S unshare,setns -F key=container-config
> -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S unshare,setns -F key=container-config
> Then muck with containers, then use ausearch --start recent -k container -i. I
> think you'll see that we know a bit about what's happening. What's needed is
> the breadcrumb trail to tie future events back to the container so that we can
> check for violations of host security policy.
> > Either that, or I have mis-understood and I should be stashing this
> > namespace ID information in an audit_aux_data structure or a more
> > permanent part of struct audit_context to be printed when required on
> > syscall exit. I'm trying to think through if it is needed in any
> > non-syscall audit messages.
> I think this is what is required. But we also have the issue where an event's
> meaning can't be determined outside of a container. (For example, login,
> account creation, password change, uid change, file access, etc.) So, I think
> auditing needs to be local to the container for enrichment and ultimately
> forwarded to an aggregating server.
There are some events that will mean more to different layers...
They should be determined by the rules in each auditd jurisdiction,
potentially one per user namespace.
Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs@xxxxxxxxxx>
Senior Software Engineer, Kernel Security, AMER ENG Base Operating Systems, Red Hat
Remote, Ottawa, Canada
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