Re: [RFC/INCOMPLETE 01/13] context_tracking: Add context_tracking_assert_state
From: Andy Lutomirski
Date: Thu Jun 18 2015 - 11:52:50 EST
On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 4:07 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 18, 2015 at 2:57 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>> * Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Jun 17, 2015 at 2:41 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > * Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> >
>>> >> This will let us sprinkle sanity checks around the kernel without
>>> >> making too much of a mess.
>>> >>
>>> >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> >> ---
>>> >> include/linux/context_tracking.h | 8 ++++++++
>>> >> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>>> >>
>>> >> diff --git a/include/linux/context_tracking.h b/include/linux/context_tracking.h
>>> >> index 2821838256b4..0fbea4b152e1 100644
>>> >> --- a/include/linux/context_tracking.h
>>> >> +++ b/include/linux/context_tracking.h
>>> >> @@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ static inline void context_tracking_task_switch(struct task_struct *prev,
>>> >> if (context_tracking_is_enabled())
>>> >> __context_tracking_task_switch(prev, next);
>>> >> }
>>> >> +
>>> >> +static inline void context_tracking_assert_state(enum ctx_state state)
>>> >> +{
>>> >> + rcu_lockdep_assert(!context_tracking_is_enabled() ||
>>> >> + this_cpu_read(context_tracking.state) == state,
>>> >> + "context tracking state was wrong");
>>> >> +}
>>> >
>>> > Please don't introduce assert() style debug check interfaces!
>>> >
>>> > (And RCU should be fixed too I suspect.)
>>> >
>>> > They are absolutely horrible on the brain when mixed with WARN_ON() interfaces,
>>> > which are the dominant runtime check interface in the kernel.
>>> >
>>> > Instead make it something like:
>>> >
>>> > #define ct_state() (this_cpu_read(context_tracking.state))
>>> >
>>> > #define CT_WARN_ON(cond) \
>>> > WARN_ON(context_tracking_is_enabled() && (cond))
>>> >
>>> > and then the debug checks can be written as:
>>> >
>>> > CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() != CONTEXT_KERNEL);
>>> >
>>> > This is IMHO _far_ more readable than:
>>> >
>>> > context_tracking_assert_state(CONTEXT_KERNEL);
>>> >
>>> > ok?
>>> >
>>> > (Assuming people will accept 'ct/CT' as an abbreviation for context tracking.)
>>>
>>> Hmm, ok I guess. The part I don't like is having ct_state() at all on
>>> non-context-tracking kernels -- it seems like it's asking for trouble.
>>
>> Well:
>>
>> - if # CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING is not se, then CT_WARN_ON() does nothing.
>>
>> - if CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING=y, but !context_tracking_is_enabled(), then
>> CT_WARN_ON() will evaluate 'cond', but won't calculate it.
>>
>> - only if CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING=y && context_tracking_is_enabled() should we
>> get as far as ct_state() evaluation.
>>
>> so I'm not sure I see the problem you are seeing.
>>
>>> We could make CT_WARN_ON not even evaluate its argument if
>>> !CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING, but then we still have ct_state() returning garbage if
>>> !context_tracking_is_enabled().
>>
>> My understanding is that if !context_tracking_is_enabled() then the compiler
>> should not even try to evaluate the rest. This is why doing a NULL pointer check
>> like this is safe:
>
> I'm fine with everything you just covered. My only objection is that,
> if ct_state() exists, then someone might call it outside CT_WARN_ON,
> in which case it will break on non-context-tracking setups.
The more I think about it, the more I dislike ct_state(). We have
in_atomic(), which is already problematic because the return value
isn't reliable. ct_state(), if callable on non context-tracking
kernels, will also be unreliable. I prefer things like
lockdep_assert_held because they can't be misused.
It would be far too easy for someone to read:
CT_WARN_ON(ct_state() != CONTEXT_KERNEL);
and add:
if (ct_state() == CONTEXT_KERNEL)
do_something();
and that would be bad.
--Andy
>
> --Andy
--
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
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