Re: [RFC] kcore:change kcore_read to make sure the kernel read is safe

From: Dave Hansen
Date: Tue Aug 04 2015 - 17:18:46 EST


On 08/03/2015 08:37 PM, yalin wang wrote:
> This change kcore_read() to use __copy_from_user_inatomic() to
> copy data from kernel address, because kern_addr_valid() just make sure
> page table is valid during call it, whne it return, the page table may
> change, for example, like set_fixmap() function will change kernel page
> table, then maybe trigger kernel crash if encounter this unluckily.

I don't see any cases at the moment that will crash. set_fixmap()
doesn't ever clear out any ptes, right?

I guess the root problem here is that we don't have any good (generic)
locking of kernel page tables inside the linear map. Can you come up
with a case where this will _actually_ crash?

> fs/proc/kcore.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/kcore.c b/fs/proc/kcore.c
> index 92e6726..b085fde 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/kcore.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/kcore.c
> @@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ static size_t get_kcore_size(int *nphdr, size_t *elf_buflen)
> size = try;
> *nphdr = *nphdr + 1;
> }
> - *elf_buflen = sizeof(struct elfhdr) +
> - (*nphdr + 2)*sizeof(struct elf_phdr) +
> + *elf_buflen = sizeof(struct elfhdr) +
> + (*nphdr + 2)*sizeof(struct elf_phdr) +

I'm having a hard time spotting the change here. Whitespace?

> 3 * ((sizeof(struct elf_note)) +
> roundup(sizeof(CORE_STR), 4)) +
> roundup(sizeof(struct elf_prstatus), 4) +
> @@ -435,6 +435,7 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
> size_t elf_buflen;
> int nphdr;
> unsigned long start;
> + unsigned long page = 0;
>
> read_lock(&kclist_lock);
> size = get_kcore_size(&nphdr, &elf_buflen);
> @@ -485,7 +486,7 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
> start = kc_offset_to_vaddr(*fpos - elf_buflen);
> if ((tsz = (PAGE_SIZE - (start & ~PAGE_MASK))) > buflen)
> tsz = buflen;
> -
> +

Please keep the unnecessary whitespace changes for another patch.

> while (buflen) {
> struct kcore_list *m;
>
> @@ -515,15 +516,32 @@ read_kcore(struct file *file, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos)
> } else {
> if (kern_addr_valid(start)) {
> unsigned long n;
> + mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
> +
> + if (page == 0) {
> + page = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (page == 0)
> + return -ENOMEM;

FWIW, we usually code this as "!page" instead of "page == 0". I also
wouldn't call it 'page'.

Also, why is this using a raw __get_free_page() while the code above it
uses a kmalloc()?

> - n = copy_to_user(buffer, (char *)start, tsz);
> + }
> + set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
> + pagefault_disable();
> + n = __copy_from_user_inatomic((void *)page,
> + (__force const void __user *)start,
> + tsz);
> + pagefault_enable();
> + set_fs(old_fs);
> + if (n)
> + memset((void *)page + tsz - n, 0, n);
> +
> + n = copy_to_user(buffer, (char *)page, tsz);

So, first of all, we are using __copy_from_user_inatomic() to copy to
and from a *kernel* addresses, and it doesn't even get a comment? :)

Fundamentally, we're trying to be able to safely survive faults in the
kernel linear map here. I think we've got to get a better handle on
when that happens rather than just paper over it when it does. (Aside:
There might actually be a missing use of get_online_mems() here.)

Maybe we should just be walking the kernel page tables ourselves and do
a kmap(). We might have a stale pte but we don't have to worry about
actual racy updates while we are doing the copy.

> /*
> * We cannot distinguish between fault on source
> * and fault on destination. When this happens
> * we clear too and hope it will trigger the
> * EFAULT again.
> */

This comment seems wrong after the patch.



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