On 10/09/2015 07:30 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
...
Openstack use case is different. There it will be prog_type_sched_cls
that can mangle packets, change skb metadata, etc under TC framework.
These are not suitable for all users and this patch leaves
them root-only. If you're proposing to add CAP_BPF_TC to let containers
use them without being CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then I agree, it is useful, but
needs a lot more safety analysis on tc side.
Well, I think if so, then this would need to be something generic for
tc instead of being specific to a single (out of various) entities
inside the tc framework, but I currently doubt that this makes much
sense. If we allow to operate already at that level, then restricting
to CAP_SYS_ADMIN makes more sense in that specific context/subsys to me.