Re: [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] Re: [KERNEL] Re: Kernel 4.3 breaks security in systems using capabilities

[Serge E. Hallyn]

On Thu, Nov 05, 2015 at 11:01:07AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 5, 2015 at 9:48 AM, Klaus Ethgen <Klaus+lkml@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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> > Am Do den  5. Nov 2015 um 18:34 schrieb Serge E. Hallyn:
> >> > Am Do den  5. Nov 2015 um 17:15 schrieb Serge E. Hallyn:
> >> > > I think if you follow your idea to its logical conclusions, you end
> >> > > up wanting set SECURE_ALL_BITS | SECURE_ALL_LOCKS, which will include
> >> > > SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, disabling ambient capabilities.
> >> >
> >> > That I did miss out and seems to be the solution for the problem. So
> >> > adding cap_secure_all_bits,cap_secure_all_locks=ep to every binary that
> >> > gets other caps should solve it?
> >>
> >> No that doesn't work, you have to use prctl to set those bits.  If you
> >> can get your system to be fully rootless, you can have init or initramfs
> >> do this for you.  It'll mean that root and setuid-root binaries have no
> >> automatic privileges beside owning host (proc/sys) files.
> >
> > So this is not helping much. But for me it is at least an idea to how to
> > have abient capabilities _and_ full control for admin. It would be an
> > un-capability but at least would allow the admin to change the
> > behaviour.
> >
> > Another one, that would be much better would be something like
> > cap_ambient_cap capability to explicitly allow the use of ambient
> > capabilities.
> >
> > I have to say that I do not know much about prctl. Just reading the man
> > page currently. But this seems to be about the second way of taking away
> > rights from UID 0 instead of explicitly giving rights to selective
> > binaries.

Not exactly.  It's restoring the full unadulterated use of posix
capabilities.

> OK, everyone, take a deep breath please.
> 
> Somewhere very high up on my personal list of generally applicable
> security advice: do not turn security knobs for the warm fully
> feelings.  Let me repeat that in all caps: DO NOT TURN SECURITY KNOBS
> FOR THE WARM FUZZY FEELINGS.
> 
> When a whole bunch of us designed and iterated on how ambient caps
> would work, we were very careful that they would *not* break
> pre-existing assumptions that SUID programs could make.  Securebits
> are very different: they very much do break pre-existing assumptions.

... thought i was clear about that.

> See, for example, CVE-2014-3215 [1], which is a local privilege
> escalation made possible a because setuid binary turned security knobs
> for the warm fuzzy feelings.

Which is why I wonder whether a mailing list - a very slow one - where
projects wanting to discuss how to best integrate with capabilities and
nnp could go for discussion, would be useful.  Very slow because for
each project 1+ people on the list would need to put in some time to
figure out what the project really needs.

> So, no, barring a really good reason and a very convincing argument
> about why it would be safe, I won't ack any attempt to add xattr knobs
> to change privilege evolution rules like that.  If you really want to
> turn knobs to make your system feel safer and be safe at the same
> time, please learn exactly what all the knobs do first and, while
> you're at it, please think carefully about how they interact.
> 
> --Andy
> 
> [1] See http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/04/29/7 and much
> related discussion
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