Re: [PATCH] fs: clear file set[ug]id when writing via mmap
From: Eric W. Biederman
Date: Mon Nov 23 2015 - 07:55:13 EST
Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx> writes:
> On Thu 19-11-15 16:10:43, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Normally, when a user can modify a file that has setuid or setgid bits,
>> those bits are cleared when they are not the file owner or a member of the
>> group. This is enforced when using write() directly but not when writing
>> to a shared mmap on the file. This could allow the file writer to gain
>> privileges by changing the binary without losing the setuid/setgid bits.
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> So I had another look at this and now I understand why we didn't do it from
> the start:
> To call file_remove_privs() safely, we need to hold inode->i_mutex since
> that operations is going to modify file mode / extended attributes and
> i_mutex protects those. However we cannot get i_mutex in the page fault
> path as that ranks above mmap_sem which we hold during the whole page
> So calling file_remove_privs() when opening the file is probably as good as
> it can get. It doesn't catch the case when suid bits / IMA attrs are set
> while the file is already open but I don't see easy way around this.
Could we perhaps do this on mmap MAP_WRITE instead of open, and simply
deny adding these attributes if a file is mapped for write?
That would seem to be a little more compatible with what we already do,
and guards against the races you mention as well.
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