[PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 102/126] crypto: nx - Fix timing leak in GCM and CCM decryption

[Luis Henriques]

3.16.7-ckt22 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Gstir <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit cb8affb55c7e64816f3effcd9b2fc3268c016fac upstream.

Using non-constant time memcmp() makes the verification of the authentication
tag in the decrypt path vulnerable to timing attacks. Fix this by using
crypto_memneq() instead.

Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ]
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c | 2 +-
 drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
index 5ecd4c2414aa..b1679db09de2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-ccm.c
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static int ccm_nx_decrypt(struct aead_request   *req,
 		processed += to_process;
 	} while (processed < nbytes);
 
-	rc = memcmp(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac, priv->oauth_tag,
+	rc = crypto_memneq(csbcpb->cpb.aes_ccm.out_pat_or_mac, priv->oauth_tag,
 		    authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0;
 out:
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nx_ctx->lock, irq_flags);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
index 025d9a8d5b19..dd4431ea1376 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/nx/nx-aes-gcm.c
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ mac:
 		scatterwalk_map_and_copy(itag, req->src, nbytes,
 				 crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req)),
 				 SCATTERWALK_FROM_SG);
-		rc = memcmp(itag, otag,
+		rc = crypto_memneq(itag, otag,
 			    crypto_aead_authsize(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req))) ?
 		     -EBADMSG : 0;
 	}
--
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