Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring

[Mimi Zohar]

On Sun, 2016-01-10 at 21:36 +1100, James Morris wrote:
> On Thu, 7 Jan 2016, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> 
> > On Thu, 2016-01-07 at 00:34 +0000, David Howells wrote:
> > > David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > 
> > > > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893:
> > > > 
> > > > 	Author: Petko Manolov <petkan@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > > > 	Date:   Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200
> > > > 	IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings
> > > > 
> > > > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional
> > > > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of
> > > > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the
> > > > system trusted keyring.
> > > > 
> > > > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any*
> > > > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring.
> > > > 
> > > > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is
> > > > quite the right solution.
> > > 
> > > Please apply this to security/next.
> > 
> > The only upstreamed trusted keyrings are the system keyring, which does
> > not permit user space to write to the keyring, and the 3 IMA keyrings.
> > 
> > For those systems without the Kconfig IMA_MOK_KEYRING option enabled,
> > get_ima_mok_keyring() does not change the existing behavior.  For
> > systems with IMA_MOK_KEYRING enabled, keys being added to the IMA
> > keyring, can be validated against the system keyring or the IMA MOK
> > keyring.
> > 
> 
> Is this a NAK on the patch?

Yes

Mimi