[PATCH 2/2] x86/kasan: write protect kasan zero shadow

[Andrey Ryabinin]

After kasan_init() executed, no one is allowed to write to kasan_zero_page,
so write protect it.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index 303e470..1b1110f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -125,10 +125,16 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may
-	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear it, since after the TLB flush
-	 * no one should write to it.
+	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since
+	 * after the TLB flush no one should write to it.
 	 */
 	memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
+		pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+		set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
+	}
+	/* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
+	__flush_tlb_all();
 
 	init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
 	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");
-- 
2.4.10