Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach
From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
Date: Thu Apr 21 2016 - 09:04:24 EST
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 11:11 AM, Stephan Mueller <smueller@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Hi Herbert, Ted,
>
> The venerable Linux /dev/random served users of cryptographic mechanisms well
> for a long time. Its behavior is well understood to deliver entropic data. In
> the last years, however, the Linux /dev/random showed signs of age where it has
> challenges to cope with modern computing environments ranging from tiny embedded
> systems, over new hardware resources such as SSDs, up to massive parallel
> systems as well as virtualized environments.
>
> With the experience gained during numerous studies of /dev/random, entropy
> assessments of different noise source designs and assessing entropy behavior in
> virtual machines and other special environments, I felt to do something about
> it.
> I developed a different approach, which I call Linux Random Number Generator
> (LRNG) to collect entropy within the Linux kernel. The main improvements
> compared to the legacy /dev/random is to provide sufficient entropy during boot
> time as well as in virtual environments and when using SSDs. A secondary design
> goal is to limit the impact of the entropy collection on massive parallel
> systems and also allow the use accelerated cryptographic primitives. Also, all
> steps of the entropic data processing are testable. Finally massive performance
> improvements are visible at /dev/urandom / get_random_bytes.
[quote from pdf]
> ... DRBG is âminimallyâ seeded with 112^6 bits of entropy.
> This is commonly achieved even before user space is initiated.
Unfortunately one of the issues of the /dev/urandom interface is the
fact that it may start providing random numbers even before the
seeding is complete. From the above quote, I understand that this
issue is not addressed by the new interface. That's a serious
limitation (of the current and inherited by the new implementation),
since most/all newly deployed systems from "cloud" images generate
keys using /dev/urandom (for sshd for example) on boot, and it is
unknown to these applications whether they operate with uninitialized
seed.
While one could argue for using /dev/random, the unpredictability of
the delay it incurs is prohibitive for any practical use. Thus I'd
expect any new interface to provide a better /dev/urandom, by ensuring
that the kernel seed buffer is fully seeded prior to switching to
userspace.
About the rest of the design, I think it is quite clean. I think the
DRBG choice is quite natural given the NIST recommendations, but have
you considered using a stream cipher instead like chacha20 which in
most of cases it would outperform the DRBG based on AES?
regards,
Nikos