[PATCH 4.2.y-ckt 11/93] packet: validate variable length ll headers
From: Kamal Mostafa
Date: Tue Apr 26 2016 - 14:46:37 EST
4.2.8-ckt9 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@xxxxxxxxxx>
[ Upstream commit 9ed988cd591500c040b2a6257bc68543e08ceeef ]
Replace link layer header validation check ll_header_truncate with
more generic dev_validate_header.
Validation based on hard_header_len incorrectly drops valid packets
in variable length protocols, such as AX25. dev_validate_header
calls header_ops.validate for such protocols to ensure correctness
below hard_header_len.
See also http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/401064
Fixes 9c7077622dd9 ("packet: make packet_snd fail on len smaller than l2 header")
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/packet/af_packet.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index d0f6b03..05a425b 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -1797,6 +1797,10 @@ retry:
goto retry;
}
+ if (!dev_validate_header(dev, skb->data, len)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len) &&
!packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
@@ -2207,18 +2211,6 @@ static void tpacket_destruct_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
sock_wfree(skb);
}
-static bool ll_header_truncated(const struct net_device *dev, int len)
-{
- /* net device doesn't like empty head */
- if (unlikely(len <= dev->hard_header_len)) {
- net_warn_ratelimited("%s: packet size is too short (%d <= %d)\n",
- current->comm, len, dev->hard_header_len);
- return true;
- }
-
- return false;
-}
-
static void tpacket_set_protocol(const struct net_device *dev,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
@@ -2301,19 +2293,19 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb,
if (unlikely(err < 0))
return -EINVAL;
} else if (dev->hard_header_len) {
- if (ll_header_truncated(dev, tp_len))
- return -EINVAL;
+ int hdrlen = min_t(int, dev->hard_header_len, tp_len);
skb_push(skb, dev->hard_header_len);
- err = skb_store_bits(skb, 0, data,
- dev->hard_header_len);
+ err = skb_store_bits(skb, 0, data, hdrlen);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
+ if (!dev_validate_header(dev, skb->data, hdrlen))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (!skb->protocol)
tpacket_set_protocol(dev, skb);
- data += dev->hard_header_len;
- to_write -= dev->hard_header_len;
+ data += hdrlen;
+ to_write -= hdrlen;
}
offset = offset_in_page(data);
@@ -2636,9 +2628,6 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
offset = dev_hard_header(skb, dev, ntohs(proto), addr, NULL, len);
if (unlikely(offset < 0))
goto out_free;
- } else {
- if (ll_header_truncated(dev, len))
- goto out_free;
}
/* Returns -EFAULT on error */
@@ -2646,6 +2635,12 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
if (err)
goto out_free;
+ if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW &&
+ !dev_validate_header(dev, skb->data, len)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
if (!gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len) &&
--
2.7.4