Re: Double-Fetch bug in Linux-4.5/drivers/scsi/aacraid/commctrl.c

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 7:50 AM, Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I found this Double-Fetch bug in Linux-4.5/drivers/scsi/aacraid/commctrl.c
> when I was examining the source code.

Thanks for these reports! I wrote a coccinelle script to find these,
but it requires some manual checking. For what it's worth, it found
your report as well:

./drivers/scsi/aacraid/commctrl.c:116:5-19: potentially dangerous
second copy_from_user()

So I should probably get this added to the coccicheck run... Maybe it
can get some clean up from Julia. :)

virtual report
virtual org

@cfu_twice@
position p;
identifier src;
expression dest1, dest2, size1, size2, offset;
@@

*copy_from_user(dest1, src, size1)
 ... when != src = offset
     when != src += offset
*copy_from_user@p(dest2, src, size2)

@script:python depends on org@
p << cfu_twice.p;
@@

cocci.print_main("potentially dangerous second copy_from_user()",p)

@script:python depends on report@
p << cfu_twice.p;
@@

coccilib.report.print_report(p[0],"potentially dangerous second
copy_from_user()")


It would be great to have some one go through all the reports to see
which are legit. I'll send separate emails with the patch for
coccicheck and the output.

-Kees

>
> In function ioctl_send_fib(), the driver fetches user space data by pointer
> arg via copy_from_user(), and this happens twice at line 81 and line 116
> respectively. The first fetched value (stored in kfib) is used to get the
> header and calculate the size at line 90 so as to copy the whole message
> later at line 116, which means the copy size of the whole message is based
> on the old value that came from the first fetch. Besides, the whole message
> copied in the  second fetch also contains the header.
>
> However, when the function processes the message after the second fetch at
> line 130, it uses kfib->header.Size that came from the second fetch, which
> might be different from the one came from the first fetch as well as
> calculated the size to copy the message from user space to driver.
>
> If the kfib->header.Size is modified by a user thread under race condition
> between the fetch operations, for example changing to a very large value,
> this will lead to over-boundary access or other serious consequences in
> function aac_fib_send().
>
> I also reported this to bugzilla,
> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116751
>
> I am expecting a reply to confirm this, thank you!
>
>
>
>
>
> Kind regards
> Pengfei
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security