[PATCH 3.2 082/115] USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write

[Ben Hutchings]

3.2.80-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@xxxxxxxxx>

commit b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb upstream.

Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.

Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c
@@ -820,6 +820,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device
 	if (!(size > 0))
 		return 0;
 
+	if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
+		/* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
+		if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
+			usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+			return 0;
+		} else {
+			usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
+			return -EPIPE;
+		}
+	}
+
 	ret = usbip_xmit(0, ud->tcp_socket, (char *)urb->transfer_buffer,
 			 size, 0);
 	if (ret != size) {