Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Mon, May 09, 2016 at 08:27:04AM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Mon, 9 May 2016, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Fri, May 06, 2016 at 01:54:14PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > On Fri, 6 May 2016, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > 
> > > > On Tue, May 03, 2016 at 04:06:27AM -0500, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> > > > > It would be helpful and instructive for anyone involved in this debate
> > > > > to review the following URL which details Intel's SGX licening
> > > > > program:
> > > > > 
> > > > > https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-sgx-product-licensing
> > > > 
> > > > I think it would be good  to note that the licensing process is available
> > > > only for Windows. For Linux you can only use debug enclaves at the
> > > > moment. The default LE has "allow-all" policy for debug enclaves.
> > > 
> > > Which makes the feature pretty useless.
> > >  
> > > > > I think the only way forward to make all of this palatable is to
> > > > > embrace something similar to what has been done with Secure Boot.  The
> > > > > Root Enclave Key will need to be something which can be reconfigured
> > > > > by the Platform Owner through BIOS/EFI.  That model would take Intel
> > > > > off the hook from a security perspective and establish the notion of
> > > > > platform trust to be a bilateral relationship between a service
> > > > > provider and client.
> > > > 
> > > > This concern has been raised many times now. Sadly this did not make
> > > > into Skyle but in future we will have one shot MSRs (can be set only
> > > > once per boot cycle) for defining your own root of trust.
> > > 
> > > We'll wait for that to happen.
> > 
> > I fully understand if you (and others) want to keep this standpoint but
> > what if we could get it to staging after I've revised it with suggested
> 
> This should not go to staging at all. Either this is going to be a real useful
> driver or we just keep it out of tree.
> 
> > changes and internal changes in my TODO? Then it would not pollute the
> > mainline kernel but still would be easily available for experimentation.
> 
> How are we supposed to experiment with that if there is no launch enclave for
> Linux available?

Understood.

I appreciate all the feedback that I've received and come back later
when the time is better with a refined patch set (especially Andys
feedback showed that the documentation needs alot of rework).

> Thanks,
> 
> 	tglx

/Jarkko