[PATCH 4.4 73/73] nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab name

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 upstream.

The slab name ends up being visible in the directory structure under
/sys, and even if you don't have access rights to the file you can see
the filenames.

Just use a 64-bit counter instead of the pointer to the 'net' structure
to generate a unique name.

This code will go away in 4.7 when the conntrack code moves to a single
kmemcache, but this is the backportable simple solution to avoiding
leaking kernel pointers to user space.

Fixes: 5b3501faa874 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: per netns nf_conntrack_cachep")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
@@ -1757,6 +1757,7 @@ void nf_conntrack_init_end(void)
 
 int nf_conntrack_init_net(struct net *net)
 {
+	static atomic64_t unique_id;
 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
 	int cpu;
 
@@ -1779,7 +1780,8 @@ int nf_conntrack_init_net(struct net *ne
 	if (!net->ct.stat)
 		goto err_pcpu_lists;
 
-	net->ct.slabname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "nf_conntrack_%p", net);
+	net->ct.slabname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "nf_conntrack_%llu",
+				(u64)atomic64_inc_return(&unique_id));
 	if (!net->ct.slabname)
 		goto err_slabname;