Re: [PATCHv2] arm64: Handle el1 synchronous instruction aborts cleanly

From: Laura Abbott
Date: Wed Jun 15 2016 - 14:29:12 EST


On 06/15/2016 04:00 AM, Mark Rutland wrote:
Hi Laura,

On Tue, Jun 14, 2016 at 11:00:35AM -0700, Laura Abbott wrote:
Executing from a non-executable area gives an ugly message:

lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA
lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0e08
lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880700
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected on CPU2, code 0x8400000e -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 2 PID: 998 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc2+ #13
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
task: ffff800077e35780 ti: ffff800077970000 task.ti: ffff800077970000
PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8
LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88

The 'IABT (current EL)' indicates the error but it's a bit cryptic
without knowledge of the ARM ARM. There is also no indication of the
specific address which triggered the fault. The increase in kernel
page permissions makes hitting this case more likely as well.
Handling the case in the vectors gives a much more familiar looking
error message:

lkdtm: Performing direct entry EXEC_RODATA
lkdtm: attempting ok execution at ffff0000084c0840
lkdtm: attempting bad execution at ffff000008880680
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000008880680
pgd = ffff8000089b2000
[ffff000008880680] *pgd=00000000489b4003, *pud=0000000048904003, *pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 8400000e [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 997 Comm: sh Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1+ #24
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
task: ffff800077f9f080 ti: ffff800008a1c000 task.ti: ffff800008a1c000
PC is at lkdtm_rodata_do_nothing+0x0/0x8
LR is at execute_location+0x74/0x88

Thanks for the updated commit message! The info is certainly an
improvement.

This generally looks good, though unfortunately I don't think this patch
alone is sufficient (more on that below).

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
v2: Clarified the messages we got a bit. Verified this applies cleanly
on top of Mark Rutland's kill-esr-lnx-exec series
---
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index eefffa8..6c6cec9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -336,6 +336,8 @@ el1_sync:
lsr x24, x1, #ESR_ELx_EC_SHIFT // exception class
cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_CUR // data abort in EL1
b.eq el1_da
+ cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR // instruction abort in EL1
+ b.eq el1_ia
cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64 // configurable trap
b.eq el1_undef
cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_SP_ALIGN // stack alignment exception
@@ -347,6 +349,23 @@ el1_sync:
cmp x24, #ESR_ELx_EC_BREAKPT_CUR // debug exception in EL1
b.ge el1_dbg
b el1_inv
+el1_ia:
+ /*
+ * Instruction abort handling
+ */
+ mrs x0, far_el1
+ enable_dbg
+ // re-enable interrupts if they were enabled in the aborted context
+ tbnz x23, #7, 1f // PSR_I_BIT
+ enable_irq
+ orr x1, x1, #1 << 24 // use reserved ISS bit for instruction aborts
+1:

I assume the ORR was meant to go after the label. We don't use 1<<24
(AKA ESR_LNX_EXEC) with my series, so it should be removed.


Ah, I misunderstood your previous comment about this.

I had a go taking this atop of the kill-esr-lnx-exec patches, adding
ESR_ELx_IABT_CUR to the is_el0_instruction_abort helper as previously
mentioned, to try to make do_page_fault do the right thing.

However, digging further I'm not sure whether having VM_EXEC in mm_flags
is sufficient, and I believe we need to reconsider the do_mem_abort
paths a bit more thoroughly.

For example, if I run:

# echo EXEC_USERSPACE > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT

Prior to this patch (with v4.7-rc3 or kill-esr-lnx-exec), I get a Bad
mode IABT message.

With this patch (atop of either kill-esr-lnx-exec or v4.7-rc3), the
thread gets stuck in a loop trying to fix up the exception.

So I think that before we take this patch we need to audit and fix up
the do_mem_abort paths, taking into account that they now need to handle
kernel instruction aborts. There are some gnarly cases to consider (e.g.
unexpectedly taking an IABT on an address we have a fixup handler for).


I knew I should have been suspicious it was going to be this easy ;)
I'll give this some thought.

Thanks,
Laura

Thanks,
Mark.

+ mov x2, sp // struct pt_regs
+ bl do_mem_abort
+
+ // disable interrupts before pulling preserved data off the stack
+ disable_irq
+ kernel_exit 1
el1_da:
/*
* Data abort handling
--
2.5.5