Re: [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open

[Ben Hutchings]

On Fri, 2016-06-17 at 08:56 +0300, Alexander Shishkin wrote:
> Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> 
> > When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all
> > access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
> > Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that
> > makes this value the default.
> 
> So this patch does two things, can it then be made into two patches?

It could.

> > 
> > This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity
> > (CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN).ÂÂThis version doesn't include making
> > the variable read-only.ÂÂIt also allows enabling further restriction
> > at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed.
> 
> This paragraph doesn't seem to belong in the commit message.

I'm giving credit where credit is due.

> What this commit message is missing entirely is the rationale behind
> this change other than "grsecurity does the same". Can you please
> elaborate?

It allows disabling a facility which in many systems is not needed and
is only a security risk.

> > Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > I made a similar change to Debian's kernel packages in August,
> > including the more restrictive default, and no-one has complained yet.
> 
> As a debian user, is this a good place to complain? Because it does get
> it the way.

OK, then you're the first one. ÂAnd you know how to change this, don't
you?

Ben.

-- 
Ben Hutchings
We get into the habit of living before acquiring the habit of thinking.
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ- Albert
Camus

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